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MAKING DISCLOSURE WORK FOR START-
UP EMPLOYEES  
  
Yifat Aran* 
Equity-based compensation of startup employees is 
attracting growing and skeptical attention in academia and 
the media. Legal and finance scholars have raised concerns 
that employees are misinformed regarding the value of their 
equity grants in a manner that could distort their employment 
and investment decisions. This Article addresses these 
emerging concerns by articulating a theoretical and practical 
framework for the regulation of start-up employees’ human 
capital investments. This framework balances the 
confidentiality interests of employers with employees’ need for 
ongoing and realistic valuation of the return on their labor.  
Start-ups commonly rely on Rule 701 of the Securities Act 
to grant equity-based compensation to their employees without 
registering these securities with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. This Article describes the flaws of the current 
regulation and proposes concrete amendments including (1) 
replacing the requirement to disclose the issuer’s financial 
statements with a requirement to disclose fair market 
valuation and exit waterfall analysis; (2) changing the 
threshold that triggers the enhanced disclosure requirement 
from when the company issues equity-based compensation 
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exceeding $10 million within a twelve month period, to when 
the company issues securities to at least 100 employees, and 
these securities aggregately convey over 10% ownership in any 
class of shares; and (3) advancing the timing of the disclosure 
from its current post-employment stage to the offer letter stage.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Equity-based compensation1 is prevalent among US 
corporations, whether privately held or publicly traded.2 
Indeed, it is the norm among privately-held venture-backed 
start-ups3 and an inherent part of the business culture of 
 
  1 This Article uses the terms equity-based compensation, equity 
compensation, and equity incentives interchangeably. It thereby refers to 
stock options, restricted stock units, and other securities commonly issued 
as employee compensation. 
  2 See Loren Rodgers, The Employee Ownership Update, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EMP. OWNERSHIP (June 3, 2019), https://www.nceo.org/article/new-data-
employee-ownership-general-social-survey [https://perma.cc/K2TL-5EZR] 
(reporting the results of the 2018 administration of the General Social 
Survey (GSS) data: “20% of private-sector workers in the U.S. have some 
level of ownership in the companies where they work, including 11 million 
who participate in ESOPs and 25 million with some other form of stock-
based compensation.”); see also A Statistical Profile of Employee Ownership, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.nceo.org/articles/employee-ownership-by-the-numbers 
[https://perma.cc/BXP9-Y6HP]; David F. Larcker et al., Cashing It In: 
Private-Company Exchanges and Employee Stock Sales Prior to IPO, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (October 9, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/09/cashing-it-in-private-company-
exchanges-and-employee-stock-sales-prior-to-ipo/ [https://perma.cc/2MEZ-
W7Q9] (“The practice of granting equity-based compensation is common 
among the private companies . . . The majority of companies grant equity-
based awards to a large percentage of their employee base” [and] “these 
awards are an important part of their overall compensation program . . .”).  
3 The term “start-up” has different meanings in different contexts. For 
the purposes of this Article the following definition by the U.S. Small 
Business Administration is useful:  
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these companies.4 Equity-based compensation at privately 
held firms is, however, problematic from a securities law 
perspective.5 Employee recipients of equity compensation are 
generally not financially sophisticated, and, typically, they do 
not qualify as accredited investors who would be permitted to 
participate in a private placement of their employers’ 
securities.6  
To solve this problem, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted Rule 701,7 which, permits the 
issuance of equity-based compensation to employees and 
 
In the world of business, the word “startup” goes beyond a 
company just getting off the ground. The term startup is also 
associated with a business that is typically technology 
oriented and has high growth potential. Startups have some 
unique struggles, especially in regard to financing. That’s 
because investors are looking for the highest potential 
return on investment, while balancing the associated risks. 
High Growth & High Tech, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., 
https://www.sba.gov/category/types-businesses/high-growth-high-tech 
[https://perma.cc/8QBL-N8ZK]. 
4 See JOSEPH R. BLASI ET AL., THE CITIZEN’S SHARE: PUTTING OWNERSHIP 
BACK INTO DEMOCRACY 94 (2013) (describing equity compensation as 
“central to the culture of start-ups”); see also Christopher Geczy et al., In 
Pursuit of Good & Gold: Data Observations of Employee Ownership & 
Impact Investment, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV.  555, 555 (2017) (noting that 
equity ownership “appears in many ways to be fundamental to today’s 
startup culture”); Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete: 
Equilibrium in High-Tech Startup Labor Markets 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235, 
1261–63 (2018) (describing the origin of equity-based compensation in 
Silicon Valley venture capital-backed start-ups). 
5 See Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold?: Equity Compensation & the 
Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613, 618 (2017) (private placement 
regulation traditionally viewed employees as vulnerable). 
6 See infra Section II.B. 
7 Exemption For Offers and Sales of Securities Pursuant to Certain 
Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts Relating to Compensation, 17 
C.F.R. § 230.701 (2018). See infra Section II.C. 
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service providers,8 in limited amounts,9 without having to 
register the offering with the SEC. Once a company issues 
equity-based compensation exceeding $10 million within a 
twelve month period, the statutory exemption requires the 
disclosure of, inter alia, the issuer’s financial statements and 
a list of risk factors associated with the investment.10  
Rule 701 is, however, profoundly flawed. The SEC adopted 
the Rule in 1988 to accommodate the growing need of start-up 
companies to rely on equity incentives as a means to attract 
and retain a highly-skilled workforce.11 However, the SEC has 
paid little attention to the other side of the employment 
equation—employees’ need for information regarding the 
value of their equity compensation.12  
The Rule fails to inform employees because it does not 
require that prospective employees receive information before 
accepting an employment offer that contains an equity 
compensation component.13 Furthermore, Rule 701 does not 
call for the disclosure of the most salient form of start-up 
 
8 Service providers are “consultants and advisors” who are “natural 
persons” that “provide bona fide services” to the company. 17 C.F.R. § 
230.701(c)(1). 
9 The aggregate sales price or amount of securities that could be sold 
under Rule 701 is the greatest of the following: $1 million; 15% of the total 
assets of the issuer, measured as of the date of the issuer’s most recent 
balance sheet; or  15% of the outstanding amount of the class of securities 
being offered and sold in reliance on Rule 701, measured as of the date of 
the issuer’s most recent balance sheet. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(d)(2). These 
limitations are calculated for the aggregate sales price or amount of 
securities sold in reliance on Rule 701 in a consecutive twelve month period. 
Id. 
10 Issuers that sell more than $10 million worth of securities under the 
exemption in a twelve month period, are required to provide to the persons 
that received the securities in that period enhanced disclosure, including: a 
summary of the material terms of the compensatory plan or compensatory 
contract; a list of risk factors associated with investing in the issuer’s 
securities; and financial statements of the issuer prepared in accordance 
with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) dated not more 
than 180 days before the sale. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e) 
11 See infra Section II.C.  
12 See infra Section III.A. 
13 See infra Section V.C. 
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valuation information—data describing the firm’s 
capitalization table and aggregate liquidation preferences.14 
Instead, once the $10 million threshold is crossed, the Rule 
mandates the disclosure of financial statements, which are 
likely to contain sensitive information of the start-up15 and are 
only remotely related to the valuation challenges facing 
employees.16 The Rule thus creates an inconsistent and, at 
times, absurd disclosure regime that puts certain issuers at 
unnecessary risk by exposing financial information that could 
be valuable to competitors but is of only marginal value to 
employees. 
When the SEC adopted Rule 701, private issuers had a 
limited ability to rely on this exemption due to securities laws 
restrictions on the volume of the securities that could be 
offered and sold and the number of employees that could 
participate in such offerings.17 However, over the years, the 
legal limitations on start-ups’ ability to issue securities for 
compensation purposes were gradually curtailed, thereby 
turning this small exemption into a significant channel of 
securities offerings to household investors.18 At the same time, 
the widespread and growing practice of providing equity-
based compensation has transformed the relationship 
between high-skilled employees and their employers from a 
pure employment relationship into one that involves a 
significant investment component.19 While household 
investors are moving their investment activities towards 
 
14 See infra Section V.B.   
15 See infra Section V.A. 
16 See infra Section III.C. 
17 See infra Section II.C.  
18 Id. 
19 See Andrea L. Eisfeldt et. al., Human Capitalists 2 (Apr. 29, 2019) 
(unpublished working paper), 
http://web.stanford.edu/class/econ310/EisfeldtApril29 
[https://perma.cc/N7KR-JUXB] (defining “human capitalists” as “corporate 
employees who receive significant equity-based compensation, for example 
in the form of equity grants or stock options,” demonstrating that human 
capitalists have become an increasingly important class of corporate income 
earners, and finding that “[e]quity-based compensation represents almost 
45% of compensation to human capitalists”). 
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institutional investors that offer diversified portfolios of 
securities,20 equity-based compensation still ties a significant 
portion of the employee’s wealth to the stock of single 
company.21 In light of the rule’s multiple shortcomings, the 
Commission’s regulation thus fails to provide start-up 
employees with material information concerning one of the 
most important investment decisions they make. 
The SEC is aware that Rule 701 may need an update. On 
July 18, 2018, it issued a concept release soliciting public 
comment about ways to modernize it.22 This Article responds 
to that call by offering practical recommendations for 
significant amendment of the disclosure regime.23  
Furthermore, this Article offers a much-needed underlying 
theoretical framework to guide the regulation of start-up 
equity compensation—a foundation that is currently missing 
from the literature.24 Start-up employees often fail to fit the 
mold of the nonaccredited capital investor because, until 
exercising their stock options, they do not bear out-of-pocket 
costs (they invest labor rather than cash). Deregulation 
advocates were, therefore, able to promote the perception that 
equity compensation is merely a benefit to employees. As a 
result, under the current disclosure regime, employee equity-
holders are effectively treated as investors who are less 
 
20 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Capitalism: 
Further Implications of Equity Intermediation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
SHAREHOLDER POWER 37–38 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 
2015) (describing the implications of modern portfolio theory on household 
investors investment pattern). 
21 Larcker et al., supra note 2 (“[Employees of pre-IPO companies] are 
also exposed to a concentrated investment portfolio with a significant 
portion of their net worth invested in a single company and no readily 
accessible public market mechanism through which to diversify.”). 
22 See Concept Release on Compensatory Securities Offerings and 
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 10521, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,958, 34,958 
(proposed July 24, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
23 See infra Part VI. 
24 See Cable, supra note 5 at 639, 641 (arguing that “one can view Rule 
701 as a triumph of incremental regulation” and that “[t]he SEC played a 
hunch” in promulgating the Rule, and concluding that “our priority should 
be a research agenda that takes seriously startup employees’ status as 
investors”).   
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worthy of protection compared to nonaccredited capital 
investors.25  
This Article offers an alternative organizing principle to 
the regulation of equity compensation:  pre-negotiated equity-
based compensation is and ought to be treated by regulators 
as an arrangement that allows workers to invest human 
capital in return for an equity stake in their employer.26 Based 
on the simple premise that human capital is a scarce resource 
whose allocation responds to equity incentives, this Article 
argues that a better disclosure regime is needed to facilitate 
the efficient allocation of talent.27 This Article further argues 
that similar to capital investments, human capital 
investments are subject to information asymmetry and 
agency problems that can disrupt market efficiency.28 
Mandatory disclosure is therefore an appropriate response to 
market failures that impede competitive forces in the labor 
market.    
The theoretical and doctrinal inquiry on which this Article 
is based is supplemented by practical insights gathered 
through a series of semistructured interviews with Silicon 
Valley employees, founders, venture capital investors, and 
attorneys29 along with survey data collected using an internet 
panel survey of 1,114 college-educated tech workers.30 These 
 
25 See infra Section III.A. 
26 See infra Sections II.A., IV.A. 
27 See infra Section IV.A. 
28 See infra Part IV. 
29 Interviews with lawyers, venture capitalists, founders, and 
employees (June 2017 to Apr. 2019) [hereinafter Interviews]. This account 
is based on thirty semi-structured interviews conducted by the author 
between June 2017 and April 2019, mostly in person, and occasionally via 
phone or Skype calls. When interviewees consented, the interview was 
recorded and transcribed. When they did not, notes were taken during the 
interview. All interviews were anonymized. Lawyers are quoted in this 
Article as (“L”), Venture Capitalist are quoted as (“VC”), Founders are 
quoted as (“F”), and employees are quoted as (“E”). 
30 Yifat Aran, Equity Compensation Study (2019) (unpublished survey 
data) (on file with author) (The survey was conducted online between March 
and October 2019 through the polling platform Lucid among workers in the 
 
4_2019.3_ARAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2020  4:44 PM 
No. 3:867] MAKING DISCLOSURE WORK 875 
empirical insights describe the real-world operations of Rule 
701 and shed light on contemporary challenges in the 
employee equity compensation domain.  
Based on both theoretical and practical considerations, the 
Article calls for a new securities regulation approach to equity 
compensation that differs from the current regime in at least 
three major aspects. 
First, the regulatory regime should acknowledge that 
employees who negotiate equity compensation as part of their 
total compensation packages, transfer value to their 
employers primarily through their human capital (as opposed 
to cash). As such, they incur an opportunity cost for their 
investment regardless of whether they incur additional, out-
of-pocket, costs down the road. These employees make an 
investment decision when accepting a job offer that includes 
an equity compensation component, not only upon exercising 
their stock options and paying the exercise price. It follows 
that capital and labor market efficiency will be enhanced if 
those employees gain access to relevant material information 
before making this employment-investment decision.31                 
Second, the regulatory regime should acknowledge that 
the valuation of a venture capital-backed start-up is often 
remote from traditional financial metrics reflected on the 
balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement of 
the start-up.32 The company’s most recent fair market 
valuation and the description of its capital structure convey 
far more useful information.33 A simple method for providing 
this more relevant information is through  disclosing an exit 
waterfall analysis that describes the employee’s personalized 
expected payout in various exit scenarios (accompanied by 
appropriate caveats about the investment’s associated 
 
United States who have earned at least a bachelor’s degree in STEM 
professions. This Article incorporates some initial findings and qualitative 
data from the survey. Survey data are available from the author upon 
reasonable request. All survey answers were anonymized.). 
31 See infra Section VI.B.  
32 See infra Sections III.B., V.C. 
33 See infra Section III.C.  
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risks).34 Armed with this information, employees would not 
need the traditional forms of disclosures now mandated by 
Rule 701, and issuers could be relieved of the risk that the 
information contained in financial statements would fall into 
the wrong hands. 
Finally, the threshold triggering the disclosure 
requirements of this financial information should be 
amended. Currently, the disclosure requirements are 
triggered when the total sales of securities under the 
exemption exceed $10 million within any period of twelve 
months (either on a rolling or an annual basis).35 This trigger 
is problematic for both practical and material reasons: it 
applies retroactively to sales that occurred during the twelve 
months even before the disclosure threshold has been 
exceeded, and it releases the vast majority of the start-up 
equity compensation market from any meaningful regulatory 
oversight.36 This Article calls for adaptation of the disclosure 
trigger from the total sales of securities to the number of 
equity-compensated employees and their aggregate 
ownership stake—and proposes the following threshold: 100 
employees who collectively hold over 10% of any class of the 
company’s shares.        
Thus, the Article responds to Rule 701’s suboptimal 
structure by suggesting several concrete changes that should 
be welcomed by issuers and employees alike.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II places Rule 701 in 
the broader context of other exemptions available to private 
issuers in compensating employees. It establishes that this 
exemption is designed to address securities offerings to 
employees who are presumed to need the securities laws’ 
investor protection provisions (i.e., they are neither accredited 
nor otherwise sophisticated) as part of a transaction that 
 
34 “Waterfall analysis” is a term commonly used to describe the 
breakdown of cash flow distribution arrangements. See, e.g., Inna J. 
Efimchik, Waterfall Analysis (How VCs See the World), AVVO (May 2, 2012), 
https://www.avvo.com/legal-guides/ugc/waterfall-analysis-how-vcs-see-the-
world [https://perma.cc/K5G3-72XG]. 
35 See infra Section II.C. 
36 See infra notes 300–03 and accompanying text. 
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involves value transfer from the employee to the issuer in 
exchange for the securities. This overview establishes that 
Rule 701 issuances are a form of investment by employees 
rather than merely a benefit bestowed upon them—an 
argument promoted by advocates of deregulation.     
Part III briefly reviews some of the explanations that the 
SEC has provided over the years for deregulating equity 
compensation, and casts doubt on these arguments. It goes on 
to offer an alternative framework for the regulation of equity 
compensation, which recognizes employees’ unique needs and 
vulnerabilities, given their lack of sophistication as investors 
and the immense complexity of start-ups’ capital structures.  
Part IV discusses the theoretical justifications for 
mandatory disclosure to equity-compensated employees by 
describing the inefficiencies caused by information 
asymmetry in the start-up equity compensation market.  
Part V describes the practical problems currently created 
by Rule 701. Specifically, this part describes three categories 
of problems with the disclosure requirements: too much, too 
little, too late. That is to say, the regulation mandates the 
disclosure of too much irrelevant and potentially harmful 
information, too little material information, in a timeframe 
that does not permit efficient decisionmaking by employees. 
Part VI offers concrete amendments to Rule 701 that will 
help close the information gap and contribute to better 
decisionmaking by employees without imposing undue costs 
on the issuer. 
II. EMPLOYEE-EQUITY HOLDERS AND THE 
SECURITIES DISCLOSURE REGIME 
 Although cast as a contemporary issue of the upper-middle 
class, the regulation of equity-based compensation has its 
roots in long-standing case law regarding blue-collar workers. 
The case law does not provide a single straightforward answer 
to the question of what the required disclosures in an offering 
of unregistered securities to the issuer’s employees are. It 
instead offers a continuum of disclosure levels that starts with 
full disclosure in the form of a registration statement and ends 
with no need to disclose any information at all. Two Supreme 
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Court decisions mark the edges of this continuum: 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel37 and SEC 
v. Ralston Purina Co.38 The decisions in both Daniel and 
Ralston Purina were given in another era and involved a 
different class of workers, but their holdings do bear directly 
on the compensation of start-up employees today.  
The intermediate cases, positioned between those two 
extremes of no disclosure (Daniel) and full disclosure (Ralston 
Purina), are governed by a series of rules and regulations that 
the SEC adopted over the years, primarily Rule 701. The 
economic realities underpinning Rule 701 offerings and the 
policy goals of their regulation can only be evaluated when 
such offerings are distinguished from a host of cases that are 
governed by other provisions. First and foremost, a distinction 
must be drawn from situations that do not involve any offer or 
sale of securities. 
A. Daniel and the “No-Sale” Doctrine 
From a legal standpoint, the use of equity-based incentives 
is subject to the requirements of the federal securities laws. 
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) 
mandates that all securities offered and sold in the United 
States be registered with the SEC or qualify for an exemption 
from the registration requirement.39 However, what 
constitutes an offer to sell securities? Oddly enough, this 
question was brought before the Supreme Court by a retired 
trucker.  
In 1973, a 63-year old truck driver named Daniel (court 
decisions do not mention his full name) retired after more 
 
37 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). 
38 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
39 Sections 5(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the sale or 
delivery after sale of unregistered securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012). 
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the offer of securities by 
federal jurisdictional means without first filing a registration statement for 
them with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c). See also Securities Act of 1933, ch. 
38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012)) 
(defining “offer” as including “every attempt or offer to dispose of, or 
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value”). 
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than twenty-two years of service.40 To be precise, it was 
twenty-two and a half years, minus a four-month involuntary 
break in his service that had occurred thirteen years earlier. 
Unfortunately for him, those four missing months were soon 
proven crucial to his future.41 After Daniel was hired, the 
union he was affiliated with negotiated a collective bargaining 
agreement with some trucking companies, including Daniel’s 
employer, to establish a pension plan for the union’s 
members.42 As part of this agreement, the trucking companies 
were required to fund the employee pension plan without 
employees making monetary contributions from their wages 
(namely, a noncontributory compulsory pension plan). To be 
eligible for a pension, Daniel was required to provide twenty 
years of continuous service; as such, due to the four months of 
involuntary break in his service, his local union had refused 
to pay him any pension benefits whatsoever, and his 
retirement account had thus been forfeited.43 
Daniel sued the union and the trustee of the pension fund 
claiming, among other things, that they had misrepresented 
and omitted material facts concerning his interest in the 
pension plan, thereby committing securities fraud.44 He also 
argued that even though he did not make monetary 
contributions to the pension fund, he had bought securities by 
means of his labor.45 The District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and later the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals accepted this line of reasoning and 
 
40 Daniel, 439 U.S. at 555. 
41 See id. 
42 See id at 553–54.   
43 Id. at 553–55. 
44 Id. at 555. 
45 Id. at 559 (“By allowing his employer to pay money into the [Pension] 
Fund, and by contributing his labor to his employer in return for these 
payments, respondent asserts he has made the kind of investment which 
the Securities Acts were intended to regulate.”).  
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denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the securities’ counts 
of the plaintiff’s complaints.46 
However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that to 
become an investor, a person must “choose to give up a specific 
consideration in return for a separable financial interest with 
the characteristics of a security.”47 The Supreme Court did not 
reject the idea that a security could be bought in exchange for 
employee labor—“[t]his is not to say that a person’s 
‘investment,’ in order to meet the definition of an investment 
contract, must take the form of cash only, rather than of goods 
and services.”48 However, in the context of an employment 
relationship that involves many compensation components 
and benefits, the Court found that the significance of the 
security component (future pension) is “attenuated.”49 Finding 
that “[o]nly in the most abstract sense may it be said that an 
employee ‘exchanges’ some portion of his labor in return for 
these possible benefits,”50 the Court concluded, “[l]ooking at 
the economic realities, it seems clear that an employee is 
selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not [to make]  
an investment.”51 Therefore, the Court dismissed all counts 
against defendants involving securities fraud.52   
The decision in Daniel suggests that an equity-based 
compensation arrangement does not constitute an offer to sell 
where the equity component cannot be differentiated from the 
other components of the compensation package. However, in 
the years following this decision, economic realities have 
changed, and a growing number of employees have started 
 
46 See Daniel v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 
1976), aff’d, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977). The Court of Appeals explained 
that “[r]ealistically speaking, employers are putting money into a fund for 
an employee’s future use which he would otherwise be getting in his 
paycheck.” Daniel v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1232 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
47 Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559.  
48 Id. at 560 n.12. 
49 Id. at 560.   
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 570.  
4_2019.3_ARAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2020  4:44 PM 
No. 3:867] MAKING DISCLOSURE WORK 881 
accepting compensation agreements in which equity grants 
represent a significant proportion of their pay.53 The SEC 
responded to these market dynamics by further developing 
the Court’s specific consideration test under the “no-sale” 
doctrine.54  
In a 1980 release, the SEC distinguished between 
noncontributory plans that do not involve an investment 
decision on the employee’s part and voluntary, contributory 
plans “where there is both an investment decision and the 
furnishing of value by participating employees.”55 In the latter 
case, a “purchase or sale” within the meaning of Section 
2(a)(3) of the Securities Act takes place.56 Conversely, the 
grant of securities to an employee under an employee benefit 
plan, such as a stock bonus plan, does not constitute a 
“purchase or sale” where the employees “do not individually 
bargain to contribute cash or other tangible or definable 
consideration to such plans.”57 
The courts followed a similar trajectory applying the “no-
sale” doctrine in cases where employees did not make an 
intentional investment decision and specifically bargain for 
the equity grant.58 On the other hand, when employers offered 
 
53 See Aran, supra note 4, at 1263. 
54 See Employee Benefit Plans: Interpretations of Statute, Securities 
Act Release No. 6188, 45 Fed. Reg. 8960, 8961 (Feb. 11, 1980) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 231) (interpretive release expressing the views of the SEC 
staff on the application of the Securities Act to employee benefit plans); see 
also Employee Benefits Plans, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6281, 
46 Fed. Reg. 8446, 8447 (Jan. 27, 1981) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 231) 
(interpretive release supplementing the 33-6188 release); Robert Anderson 
IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1195, 1217 (2003). 
55 Employee Benefits Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. at 8961.  
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012). 
57 Employee Benefits Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. at 8968. 
58 See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539, 545 (D.N.J. 
1999) (holding that the “plaintiff did not receive her options as part of a 
bargained-for exchange that required her to make an affirmative 
investment decision”); see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” 
Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 799, 877, 882, 902 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding that there 
was no sale because the corporate client’s stock option plans were 
noncontributory and compulsory for its employees). 
4_2019.3_ARAN (DO NOT DELTE) 1/8/2020  4:44 PM 
882 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
equity grants to prospective employees as inducements to 
accept employment (as opposed to inducements to continue 
employment), the courts included the plaintiff-employee 
under the scope of the Securities Act’s protection.59 In this 
determination, courts examined the existence of an 
affirmative decision by the prospective employee to accept a 
compensation scheme that included an equity component in 
return for his or her labor.60 When such bargained-for 
consideration for the securities was recognized,  courts 
concluded that a “purchase” of securities had taken place.61   
 
59 See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 81 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (D.N.J. 
2000) (differentiating the case from those “where the employee changed his 
employment status in return for individually bargained-for compensation 
including stock options” which does constitute a “purchase or sale”); see also 
Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 
1985) (the plaintiff agreed to work for the defendant in return for an annual 
salary of $40,000 plus options to purchase up to 30,000 shares of the 
defendant’s stock). In addressing a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
securities fraud claim, the Judge Friendly, writing for the court, found that 
the existence of a contract for the sale of up to 30,000 shares of stock meets 
the definition of a “sale” or “sell” within the meaning of the Securities Act:  
[W]e perceive no reason why . . . Congress should have 
wished the courts to exclude from the benefits of facially 
applicable language a person who parts with his or her 
established way of life in return for a contract to issue stock. 
As the Supreme Court has noted in a similar context, “[t]he 
economic considerations and realities present . . . are similar 
in important respect[s] to the risk an investor undertakes 
when purchasing shares. Both are relying on the value of 
the securities themselves, and both must be able to depend 
on the representations made by the transfer of the securities 
. . . . 
Id. at 560. 
60 See Rudinger v. Ins. Data Processing, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (“Defendants construe the requirements of a ‘purchase’ too 
narrowly. True, Rudinger never spent money on IDP stock. But an integral 
part of his contract with IDP promised him a ‘stock option or stock purchase 
plan.’”).  
61 See Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1289 (D. Mass. 1972) (“[T]he 
option was a quid pro quo offered to induce plaintiff to enter into the employ 
of [defendant].”); see also Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Grp., 695 F. Supp. 138, 148 
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The “no-sale” doctrine, therefore, helps differentiate 
between two groups of employee-equity holders: the first 
group includes employees who receive securities as a mere 
benefit, without specifically negotiating for these securities 
and thereby transferring value to the issuer.62 The second 
group includes employees who expressly contracted in a 
compensation agreement for an equity component in their 
compensation structure. These employees are presumed to 
accept their job offer partly based on the allure of equity 
incentives and, as such, they choose to invest their human 
capital in their employers’ securities.  
The decision in Daniel and the subsequent development of 
the “no-sale” doctrine bear on the compensation of start-up 
employees today. Given that the common practice in venture 
capital-backed start-ups is to offer equity compensation as 
part of a prenegotiated compensation agreement (i.e., equity 
grants are offered to prospective employees as inducements to 
accept employment),63 it is safe to say that the vast majority 
of start-up employees fall under the category of employee-
investors who are covered by the Securities Act. These 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying a motion to dismiss on the grounds that there was 
no “sale” given that “plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that a sale of securities 
occurred when plaintiff accepted Hutton’s offer of employment”).  
62 Cf. Simon M. Lorne, Accommodating the Securities Laws to Employee 
Benefit Plans, 1979 DUKE L.J. 421, 427 (“Such a view rested to some extent 
on a legal fiction, since monetary payments pursuant to an organized plan 
between an employer and employees certainly lack most characteristics of 
a gift.”).  
63 According to a 2012 survey by National Center for Employee 
Ownership, the most common way to be awarded an equity grant as an 
employee at a privately held company is upon hire. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. 
OWNERSHIP, PRIVATE COMPANY EQUITY COMPENSATION SURVEY REPORT 6 
(2012), http://www.sos-team.com/pdfs/nceoresults.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KP8E-C36A]; see also, Joseph Bankman, The Structure of 
Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1750 (1994) (explaining 
that because start-ups provide “contingent compensation” in the form of 
equity, “employees sacrifice the higher cash salary” they might obtain at 
“more established companies”); Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give 
Me Death—The Role of Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 265, 274 (2006) (noting that start-ups can 
“compete for talent without offering more cash” by offering equity instead). 
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employees transfer value in the form of human capital to the 
firm and are presumed to be in need of the Securities Act’s 
protection. However, to determine the appropriate level of 
protection, another question should be considered, besides the 
receipt of consideration for the securities by the issuer. The 
second question relates to the position of the employee, and 
the type of information that he or she possesses about the 
issuer’s business—as discussed in the following Section.   
B Private Offering Exemptions and the “Fend-for-
Themselves” Test    
After finding that the equity grant in question is 
exchanged for value, the second question to consider when 
determining the level of required disclosure in an offering of 
unregistered securities to the issuer’s employees is the 
investment proficiency of the employee—namely, whether the 
employee can “fend for himself.” The Supreme Court 
introduced this test to distinguish between public and private 
offerings in 1953 in a case involving agricultural workers.64 In 
response, the SEC, as part of Regulation D, later developed 
and clarified the boundaries of the private offering 
exemption.65     
In 1953, the SEC brought an action against Ralston 
Purina, a manufacturer and distributor of various feed and 
cereal, for selling unregistered common stock to hundreds of 
employees.66 These employees purchased the shares in private 
placements at market-rate prices.67 The company argued in 
its defense that the sales were exclusive to “key employees” 
and therefore were exempted from registration according to 
Section 4(1) (today Section 4(a)(2)) of the Securities Act, which 
 
64 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).  
65 See Definitions and Terms Used in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 
230.501(a) (2018). 
66 See Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 120–21 (noting that among these 
were “employees with the duties of artist, bakeshop foreman, chow loading 
foreman, clerical assistant, copywriter, electrician, stock clerk, mill office 
clerk, order credit trainee, production trainee, stenographer, and 
veterinarian”).   
67 See id. at 121. 
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exempts transactions “not involving any public offering” (also 
known as the private offering exemption).68 The company 
broadly defined the term “key employees” to include rank-and-
file employees who demonstrated some special contribution to 
the company or potential for promotion.69 The Court rejected 
the company’s line of argument and stated that the Securities 
Act is designed “to protect investors by promoting full 
disclosure of information thought necessary to inform 
investment decisions.”70 Consequently, the Court reasoned, 
the natural interpretation of the private offering exemption 
requires examining whether the particular class of offerees 
needs the Act’s protection.71 If the offerees “are shown to be 
able to fend for themselves,” then the transaction can be 
viewed as exempt under the private offering exemption.72  
The Court stressed that, as a rule, “employees are just as 
much members of the investing ‘public’ as any of their 
neighbors in the community.”73 Therefore, by and large, 
employees are subject to the full protection of the Securities 
Act. Nonetheless, the Court accepted that under special 
circumstances, certain employees could participate in a 
private offering (exempted under Section 4(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act). As an example, the Court specifically 
mentioned an offering “made to executive personnel who 
because of their position have access to the same kind of 
information that the Act would make available in the form of 
a registration statement.”74   
 
68 Id. at 121–22. 
69 See id. 
70 Id. at 124. 
71 Id. at 125. 
72 Id. The exemption would be available only if the offerees also had 
access to, or were given, the kind of information that would be available in 
a registration statement. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 
893, 902–03 (5th Cir. 1977).  
73 Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 126.  
74 Id. at 125–26. 
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In 1982, as part of Regulation D, the SEC promulgated 
Rule 506,75 which expresses the SEC’s interpretation of the 
private offering exemption. The exemption under Rule 506 
limits the sale either to “accredited investors”76 or otherwise 
sophisticated persons, meaning that they have sufficient 
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters 
to make them capable of evaluating the prospective 
investment’s merits and risks.77 The term “accredited 
investor” is defined in Rule 501 and encompasses institutional 
investors78 and officers79 along with high-net-worth80 and 
high-income individuals.81  
Rule 506 offerings are particularly useful for start-up 
companies because the rule does not place a limit on the 
aggregate number of securities a company can issue. 
Moreover, as long as the offering is exclusive to accredited 
investors, the rule does not mandate providing disclosures to 
offerees.82 Rule 506 transactions are, however, still subject to 
 
75 Exemption for Limited Offers and Sales Without Regard to Dollar 
Amount of Offering, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).  
76 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(1)(ii). The definition of “accredited investor” is 
also set forth in Regulation D. See Definitions and Terms Used in 
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2018). 
77 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (“Each purchaser who is not an 
accredited investor either alone or with his purchaser representative(s) has 
such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is 
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment.”).  
78 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)–(3).  
79 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4). 
80 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (including natural persons “whose 
individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, exceeds 
$1,000,000,” excluding the value of the person’s primary residence). 
81 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (including those “who had an individual 
income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint 
income with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years 
and ha[ve] a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in 
the current year”).  
82 See Darian M. Ibrahim, Public or Private Venture Capital? 33 
(William & Mary Law Sch. Research Paper No. 09-383, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3266756 
[https://perma.cc/FXD6-4SY3] (discussing lack of disclosure requirements 
under Rule 506, “the most commonly-used exemption by startups”).  
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the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.83 Rule 
506 is also useful for certain compensatory equity awards, 
particularly those aimed at the company’s directors, executive 
officers and other employees and service providers who meet 
the accredited investor criteria due to their income or net 
worth.84 
The private offering exemptions (Section 4(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act and Rule 506) therefore further divide the 
population of equity-compensated employees in the following 
way: among the employees who negotiated their equity 
compensation and are therefore considered investors, some 
employees qualify as “accredited investors” due to their role in 
the organization (directors and executive team), their income, 
or their high net worth.85 These employees can participate in 
a private offering that is not subject to the requirement to 
disclose detailed information. The other employees, those who 
have negotiated their equity compensation but do not qualify 
as accredited investors, constitute a distinct group of investors 
whose needs the SEC did not address until 1988.      
 
83 See Fast Answers: Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (last modified Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answers-rule506htm.html [https://perma.cc/4Q67-LQGZ] 
(“Companies must decide what information to give to accredited investors, 
so long as it does not violate the antifraud prohibitions of the federal 
securities laws.”). 
84 See Securities Act Rules,  U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (last 
updated Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-
interps.htm [https://perma.cc/JZ9E-352B] (“[A]n issuer may rely on an 
available alternative exemption such as . . . a private placement exemption 
under Rule 506 of Regulation D or Section 4(2) for the sales in excess of the 
Rule 701(d) limits and rely on Rule 701 for sales that do not exceed the Rule 
701(d) limits.” (quoting the answer to Question 271.07)); see also Joseph M. 
Wallin et al., Start-up Equity Awards: Securities Law Considerations, 
THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L., July 2015, at 1, 5, http://joewallin.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Start-up-Equity-Awards-Securities-Law-
Considerations-3-610-2005-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/B67C-QAEY] (“In 
practice, Rule 506(b) is only available when an award recipient is an AI 
[Accredited Investor].”). 
85 Wallin et al., supra note 84, at 5. 
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C. Rule 701 Exemption for Compensatory 
Arrangements 
To reiterate, Section II.A establishes that under Daniel 
and the “no-sale” doctrine, equity grants that employees 
receive as a mere benefit, without pre-employment 
negotiation and corresponding value transfer, do not require 
any disclosure of information. Section II.B further establishes 
that under Ralston Purina and Rule 506, employees who can 
fend for themselves, in the sense of either being sophisticated 
or who otherwise qualify as accredited investors, can 
participate in a private offering that does not involve 
substantial disclosure requirements. These exemptions, 
however, do not address start-ups’ need to offer equity 
compensation in negotiations with prospective employees who 
are not particularly sophisticated or of high net worth. This 
void is the reason for the adoption of Rule 701.  
Before addressing the terms of Rule 701 offerings, it is 
worth mentioning the background of the rule’s promulgation 
and its evolution over the years. The typical model for a start-
up company, which took form in Silicon Valley during the 
1970s and the 1980s with the rise of information technology, 
includes a unique feature: employees at virtually all ranks 
hold an ownership stake in the company.86 This form of 
compensation emerged during Silicon Valley’s inception as an 
alternative model to the more centralized and hierarchical 
organizational culture of East Coast corporate America, which 
held that companies should reserve equity grants only to 
management.87 Simultaneously, in the early 1980s, personal 
computers became household items, and numerous related 
hardware and software companies began proliferating in 
 
86 See Aran, supra note 4, at 1263 (describing the origin of broad-based 
equity compensation in Silicon Valley); see also JOSEPH R. BLASI ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 8; CHRISTOPHE LÉCUYER, MAKING SILICON VALLEY: 
INNOVATION AND THE GROWTH OF HIGH TECH, 1930–1970, 265 (Wiebe E. 
Bijker et al. eds., 2006).  
87 See Aran, supra note 4, at 1262.  
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Silicon Valley and elsewhere.88 As part of this process, the new 
high-tech industry experienced a pressing need to adopt 
employee equity compensation plans as a means to attract 
and, even more so, retain skilled workers.89 Since the mid-
1980s, scholars, industry representatives, and attorneys have 
called on the SEC to create a special exemption that would 
allow start-ups to offer equity compensation to prospective 
employees, thereby enabling these emerging businesses to 
compete for talent against better-established public firms.90  
At the forefront of promoting these initiatives was the SEC 
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital 
Formation (hereinafter Forum on Small Business) that the 
SEC established in 1982 pursuant to the Small Business 
Investment Incentive Act of 1980.91 Starting in 1985, this 
forum called for easing the investor protection guarantees of 
the Securities Act in cases where the nature of a securities 
transaction is essentially compensatory.92  
 
88 See, e.g., ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND 
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, 108–09 (1994) (discussing 
the proliferation of electronics firms in Silicon Valley and Route 128 in the 
1980s); Matt Weinberger, 36 Photos Showing How Silicon Valley Went from 
Prune Orchards to the Center of the Tech World, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 10, 
2015), https://www.businessinsider.my/history-of-silicon-valley-in-photos-
2015-11/ [https://perma.cc/3Y7R-JG43] (“By the mid-eighties, Silicon Valley 
was established as the center of the computer industry, which was only on 
the rise . . . . The eighties would give way to the nineties, bringing a new 
kind of company to Silicon Valley[, t]hanks to the PC starting to hit the 
mainstream . . .”).  
89 See David B. Wilks, Employee Equity Incentive Plans for Small 
Companies: A Proposal for a Specific Registration Exemption from the 1933 
Act, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1129, 1129–30 (1987).  
90 Id. at 1332; see also Cable, supra note 5, at 625–26 (describing the 
source of deregulation initiatives in the equity compensation domain). 
91 Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 80(a)(1)–80(a)(64) (2012)); see Cable, supra note 5, at 625–26.  
92 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 1985 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS 
FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION 25–31 (1986) [hereinafter 
1985 REPORT] (calling to deregulate equity compensation); U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, 1986 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL 
BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION 34 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 REPORT] (arguing 
that the special nature of employee stock offerings requires that companies 
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The SEC responded in 1988 by creating Rule 701, which 
allowed non-reporting companies to offer and sell securities as 
part of compensatory arrangements without the need to 
register the securities.93 The SEC explained that it would be 
an unreasonable burden to require these non-reporting 
companies, many of which are small businesses, to incur the 
expenses and disclosure obligations of public companies in 
cases in which their sales of securities were confined to 
employees and sophisticated investors.94 To distinguish Rule 
701 offerings from the kind of offerings the Court deemed in 
Ralston Purina as public, the rule explicitly states that the 
exemption from registration is not available for plans or 
schemes intended to raise capital.95 Likewise, in accordance 
with the small offering exemption of the Securities Act, the 
original version of the rule placed annual volume limits of up 
to $5 million.96  
 
be allowed to “expand their use of stock as part of their total employee 
benefit package” without limitations on the size of the offerings in dollar 
amounts or number of employees). 
93 See Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts, Securities Act 
Release No. 6768, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,918, 12,919 (Apr. 20, 1988) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts 200, 230, 239) (referencing pt. I(A)(2)). 
94 See Employee Benefit and Compensation Contracts, Securities Act 
Release No. 6726, 52 Fed. Reg. 29,033, 29,033 (Aug. 5, 1987) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts 230, 239)  (explaining that the essential concern addressed 
by the proposals was the burden of complying placed on private companies). 
95 Preliminary Note 5 to Rule 701 addresses the scope of the exemption. 
See Exemption for Offers and Sales of Securities Pursuant to Certain 
Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts Relating to Compensation, 17 
C.F.R. § 230.701 (2019) (“This section also is not available to exempt any 
transaction that is in technical compliance with this section but is part of a 
plan or scheme to evade the registration provisions of the [Securities] Act. 
In any of these cases, registration under the [Securities] Act is required 
unless another exemption is available.”). The distinction is somewhat 
artificial because the purpose of the offer to employees at Ralston Purina 
was to encourage employee ownership and not to raise capital. See SEC v. 
Ralston Purina Co., 200 F.2d 85, 91, 93 (8th Cir. 1952) (“[T]he sole purpose 
[was] enabling them to secure a proprietary interest in the company or to 
increase the interest already held by them.”). 
96 See Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts, 53 Fed. Reg. at 
12,919 (referencing pt. I (A)(2)). In its original form, Rule 701 permitted the 
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At the time when the SEC adopted Rule 701, private 
issuers’ ability to rely on this exemption was limited not only 
in the volume of securities offered and sold but also in the 
number of equity-compensated employees allowed. That is 
because after crossing a threshold of 500 equity holders (“held-
of-record”), private issuers assumed the reporting obligations 
of public companies.97 In such situations, most companies 
preferred going public over assuming the costs of public 
reporting obligations without the benefits of having access to 
public capital markets. Thus, the “500-held-of-record” 
threshold effectively deterred companies from granting equity 
incentives to hundreds of employees for fear of not being able 
to control the timing of their initial public offering (IPO) 
(which will be dictated by the pace of option exercise by 
employees).  
However,  due to constant industry pressure applied over 
the years, the limitations on private issuers’ ability to issue 
securities for compensation purposes were gradually 
curtailed,98 thereby turning this small exemption into a 
 
amounts of securities offered and sold annually to be the greatest of 
$500,000; 15% of total assets of the issuer; or, 15% of the outstanding 
securities of the class, subject to an absolute limit of $5,000,000 derived 
from Section 3(b) of the Securities Act. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(d)(2).  
97 Rule 701 has never specified a ceiling to the number of offerees who 
could participate in a Rule 701 offering. However, when the Rule was 
adopted, the number of such offerees was nevertheless limited. The 
limitation did not stem from Rule 701 itself but rather from Section 12(g) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which sets a cap on the number of 
shareholders (referred to in the Act as “held of record”) a private company 
may have before it becomes subject to the Act’s reporting requirements. See 
15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012). At the time of Rule 701 adoption, Section 12(g) set 
a maximum shareholder threshold of 500, including both investors who 
received shares in return for capital investments and employees who 
received equity as compensation. See Aran, supra note 4, at 1284–85.   
98 In 1996, Congress enacted the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 (the “NSMIA”), which gave the SEC the authority 
to provide exemptive relief under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, of more 
than $5 million for transactions such as offers to employees. National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 
3416. Subsequently in 1999, the SEC amended Rule 701, lifting the $5 
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significant channel of securities offerings to household 
investors.99 In their most recent deregulation initiative, the 
SEC commissioners unanimously voted on July 18, 2018 to lift 
the threshold at which companies are required to disclose 
financial information to Rule 701 offerees from $5 million to 
$10 million, with automatic subsequent increases every five 
years to account for inflation.100 The amendment was made 
following the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
 
million volume ceiling and replacing it with an enhanced disclosure 
requirement. See Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory 
Arrangements, Securities Act Release No. 7645, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,095 (Mar. 
8, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).  Furthermore, the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 raised the threshold at which 
companies become subject to public company reporting obligations from 500 
shareholders to either 2,000 shareholders or 500 shareholders who are not 
accredited investors. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C. (2012)) In addition, and more importantly, the JOBS Act of 
2012 further allowed companies to exclude securities held by Rule 701 
offerees when counting their shareholders. It thereby removed the 
limitation of Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act on the number of 
employees and service providers that start-ups could compensate with 
equity while staying private. See Aran, supra note 4, at 1288; see also Cable, 
supra note 5, at 626. 
99 Rule 701 offerings are not registered, and therefore any estimate as 
to the total value of securities awarded to employees in Rule 701 offerings 
is inaccurate. The standard employee option pool in VC-backed companies 
has changed throughout the years between 10–15%. See Henry Ward, 
Investors vs. Employees, CARTA (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://carta.com/blog/investors-vs-employees-2/ [https://perma.cc/RY6S-
5PMN]; see also Adley Bowden, How Big Should an Employee Option Pool 
Be?, PITCHBOOK (Oct. 31, 2016), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/how-
big-should-an-employee-option-pool-be [https://perma.cc/PFD3-ARVR]. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no available data on the 
aggregate market cap of VC-backed private companies in the U.S. The 
estimate as to the aggregate valuation of U.S. unicorn companies (valued at 
$1 billion or more) in 2018 was $718 billion. See Aggregate US Unicorn 
Valuation Surpasses $700B, PITCHBOOK (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://pitchbook.com/newsletter/aggregate-us-unicorn-valuation-
surpasses-700b [https://perma.cc/S4EX-WU26].   
100 See Concept Release on Compensatory Securities Offerings and 
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 10521, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,940, 39,941 (July 
24, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
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Consumer Protection Act signed by President Trump on May 
24, 2018, and, inter alia, directs the SEC to adopt an 
amendment to Rule 701.101  
 Under the current version of Rule 701, the issuer must 
deliver a copy of the compensatory benefit plan or contract to 
the equity recipients.102 No other disclosures, however, are 
necessary besides what the circumstances might require 
under the general antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws, as long as  the volume of securities offered 
does not exceed the $10 million threshold.103 In contrast, if the 
aggregate sale price of securities sold during the twelve month 
period exceeds the $10 million threshold, the issuer must 
deliver to investors within a reasonable period before the date 
of sale the following: (1) a copy of the summary plan 
description required by ERISA or a summary of the plan’s 
material terms if it is not subject to ERISA,104 (2) information 
about the risks associated with an investment in the securities 
sold under the plan or contract,105 and (3) financial statements 
required to be furnished by Part F/S of Form 1-A under 
Regulation A (essentially a simplified registration form, 
similar to a prospectus, but less detailed and allowing for 
unaudited but GAAP-prepared financial statements).106 These 
financial statements must be as of a date no more than 180 
days before the sale of securities relying on Rule 701.107  
Thus, Rule 701 differentiates between employees who are 
not entitled to receive financial information and employees 
who must receive access to the company’s financial 
statements, based on the annual volume of the company’s 
Rule 701 offerings.    
 
101 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018). 
102 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e). 
103 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (“These transactions are not exempt from the 
antifraud, civil liability, or other provisions of the federal securities laws.” 
(quoting Preliminary Note 1)). 
104 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e)(1)–(2). 
105 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e)(3). 
106 Offering Statement, 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (2018).   
107 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e)(4). 
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To summarize this Part of the Article, as described in 
Figure 1, the level of disclosure in an offering to employees is 
determined by three key questions:  
1. Are the securities bargained-for by the employee? (In 
other words, did the employee transfer value to the company 
in exchange for the securities?) If the answer is negative, then 
according to the principles set forth in Daniel and the “no-
sale” doctrine, the Securities Act does not cover the 
transaction. Conversely, if the answer is positive, a sale of 
securities took place and the employee is presumed to need 
the Securities Act’s protection.  
2. Can the employee fend for himself? If the employee is 
accredited or an otherwise sophisticated investor, then only 
the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act are applicable. 
Conversely, if the employee is neither an accredited investor 
nor otherwise sophisticated, the issuer will need to rely on 
Rule 701 to exempt its issuance of securities from the 
registration requirements of the Securities Act.  
3. Does the volume of the sales in reliance on the Rule 701 
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If not, then according to Rule 701(e), only a copy of the 
compensatory benefit plan or contract must be delivered. 
However, if the answer is positive, the issuer is required to 
provide enhanced disclosures to Rule 701 investors, including 
a summary of risk factors and its financial statements. 
 
III. POLICY RATIONALES AND OBJECTIVES FOR 
DISCLOSURE TO START-UP EMPLOYEES     
Part II establishes that employees who negotiate equity 
compensation agreements are making an investment decision. 
It also establishes that, in general, rank-and-file employees 
are presumed to be in need of the Securities Act protection. 
Given that, what are the explanations for the exemption of 
compensatory issuances from the registration requirement of 
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the Securities Act? In other words, what were the rationales 
set forth for the SEC’s policy regarding equity compensation? 
The following Part discusses the rationales offered by the 
SEC for the deregulation of equity-based compensation, 
addresses the weakness in the SEC’s stand, and proposes an 
alternative theoretical framework to serve as a foundation for 
the regulation of disclosures to equity-compensated startup 
employees.  
A. Regulation in Search of Policy Objectives 
It is difficult to identify the objectives and policy 
considerations that guide the regulation and deregulation of 
equity compensation, as the SEC has written fairly little on 
this subject.108 The legislative history indicates that it was 
industry pressure rather than systematic thinking and clear 
policy goals that drove reforms in this domain.109  
Still, the principal rationales behind the SEC’s actions 
could be distilled from the Commission’s releases and from the 
Forum on Small Business’s annual reports.110 In 1999, as part 
of a major reform of Rule 701 that replaced the rule’s original 
volume limitations,111 the SEC explained that this domain 
should be deregulated because “[t]he type and amount of 
disclosure needed in a compensatory securities transaction 
differ from that needed in a capital-raising transaction.”112 
 
108 See Cable, supra note 5, at 627–28 (“What policy rationale underlies 
this liberalization of equity compensation regulation . . . ? The regulatory 
and legislative history is surprisingly uninformative.”). 
109 Id. at 628 (“[I]t is reasonably clear that Rule 701, its continued 
expansion . . . were efforts to accommodate Silicon Valley startups. But it is 
not at all clear which attributes of this particular workforce, or this 
particular investment context, warranted the break with private placement 
tradition.”). 
110 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
111 See Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements, 
Securities Act Release No. 7645, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,095, 11,097 (Mar. 8, 1999) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230); see also supra note 100 and 
accompanying text.  
112 Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements, 64 
Fed. Reg. at 11,097.  
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The SEC further explained that “[i]n a bona fide 
compensatory arrangement, the issuer is concerned primarily 
with compensating the employee-investor rather than 
maximizing its proceeds from the sale.”113  
Although the argument is presented as a single reasoning, 
it incorporates two distinct claims: one regarding employees’ 
need for information and the other regarding the issuer’s 
motives. The first argument is that in a compensatory 
securities transaction, the need for information is relaxed 
compared to a capital-raising transaction. According to the 
SEC, “[b]ecause the compensated individual has some 
business relationship, perhaps extending over a long period of 
time, with the securities issuer, that person will have acquired 
some, and in many cases, a substantial amount of knowledge 
about the enterprise.”114 However, in the same release, the 
SEC also explains that under certain conditions (large volume 
offerings), employees do need some information to make well-
informed investment decisions: “we believe that a minimal 
level of disclosure consisting of risk factors and Regulation A 
unaudited financial statements is essential to meet even the 
lower level of information needed to inform compensatory-
type investors such as employees and consultants.”115 
The second argument that seems to guide the deregulation 
initiatives of equity compensation is that granting equity 
compensation is considerably different from a capital-raising 
transaction because the former is intended to reward 
employees rather than to maximize the issuer’s proceeds. 
Similarly, the 1985 Forum on Small Business Annual Report 
offered the following distinction:  
Where the arrangement is fundamentally an 
investment transaction (e.g., employee stock 
purchases at fair market value, perhaps as part of an 
offering to outside investors), the investor protection 
principles of securities law should continue to prevail. 
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is essentially compensatory, to provide benefits to the 
employee, rather than investment-oriented (e.g., 
below-market sales or favorable stock options). In 
these cases, while an investment element may exist, 
the compensatory aspects are predominant and 
should not be thwarted by securities law impediments 
designed primarily to protect investors in fund-raising 
transactions.116 
The regulatory policy towards equity-based compensation 
is thus built on two arguments: employees have limited need 
for information, and employers have (mostly) the best 
intentions at heart. These arguments fall short of establishing 
an adequate justification for a regulatory exemption because 
they disregard the economic realities of the equity 
compensation market and the basic principles of securities 
law, as discussed in the following Section.   
B. Weakness in the SEC’s Reasoning 
Overall, the SEC’s reasoning regarding employees’ relaxed 
need for information fails to take into account that the most 
important investment decision— i.e., whether or not to accept 
a job offer—is made prior to the start of employment, before 
the employee develops an extended relationship with the 
issuer and obtains inside knowledge about the company.117 
Moreover, as discussed in Section II.B above, an employee 
who holds a position that allows him or her to access relevant 
financial information does not depend on a Rule 701 
exemption (as, according to Ralston Purina, well-informed, 
highly ranked employees can be included in a private 
offering).118  
Furthermore, if employees indeed enjoy access to sufficient 
information, why should they receive enhanced disclosures 
 
116 See 1985 REPORT, supra note 92, at 27.  
117 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP, supra note 63, at 4; see also 
Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting L04: “I would argue the big investment 
decision was the day you decided to take the offer.”); see also infra Section 
V.C.   
118 See supra Section II.B. 
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once the $10 million threshold has been triggered? Similarly, 
if employees indeed need a “minimal level of disclosure” to be 
able to make well-informed “compensatory-type” investment 
decisions, why shouldn’t employees of companies that issue 
less than $10 million worth of equity awards in a year receive 
this information?  
The argument that the issuer is “primarily” concerned with 
“compensating the employee-investor rather than maximizing 
its proceeds,” is also far from convincing. First, the weight 
given to the issuer’s intentions is inconsistent with a 
fundamental principle of securities law according to which the 
motivation of the issuer does not matter; only the offeree’s 
need for information matters.119 Furthermore, as established 
in Section II.A above, the case law that evolved following the 
decision in Daniel and the no-sale doctrine recognize that 
when an equity grant is entirely aimed at benefiting the 
employee, there is no need for disclosure because there is no 
sale to begin with.120 Hence, the type of arrangements covered 
by Rule 701 are those that involve some value transfer by the 
employee as part of a bargained-for compensation package. 
The fact that the issuer does not seek to maximize immediate 
proceeds from the sale does not imply that the issuer does not 
wish to maximize other gains, such as reducing employee 
mobility. 
Moreover, many prospective employees are swayed by the 
idea that they could earn windfall gains by accepting equity 
instead of cash and are therefore willing to take a sizable pay 
cut in return for an equity stake.121 Start-up employees often 
 
119 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25, 127 (1953); 
see also SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass’n, 120 F.2d 738, 740–41 (2d 
Cir. 1941).   
120 See supra Section II.A.  
121 Out of 525 college-educated technology workers who were asked if 
they would rather be paid $110,000 annual cash salary or be paid $100,000 
annual cash salary and shares representing 0.5% ownership stake an early-
stage start-up, 79% (416 respondents) preferred equity over cash. Out of 589 
respondents who were asked if they would rather be paid $130,000 annual 
cash salary or be paid $100,000 annual cash salary and shares representing 
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need to weigh competing job offers and/or decide on the 
tradeoff between cash and equity in their compensation 
packages—decisions that require them to estimate the 
potential value of the equity being offered.122 Some employees 
also strategically time their resignations to meet vesting 
schedule requirements,123 and others make bets on startups’ 
 
0.5% ownership stake, 60% (353 respondents) preferred equity over cash. 
See Aran, supra note 30. 
122 For depictions of this phenomenon in popular media outlets, see e.g., 
Herry Lian, You Got an Offer at a Startup. Now What?, HACKERNOON (Feb. 
25, 2017), https://hackernoon.com/you-got-an-offer-at-a-startup-now-what-
4de80a6935f4 [https://perma.cc/7FPM-S2VV] (“Many people take a startup 
role instead of a big corporation gig in hopes of striking rich with their stock 
options . . . .”); Napala Pratini, Salary vs Equity: How to Decide What’s Right 
For You, HIRED (Mar. 21, 2018), https://hired.com/blog/candidates/salary-
vs-equity-how-decide-whats-right/ [https://perma.cc/5LSS-9A5X] (“In the 
world of tech jobs, it’s common—and often expected—that companies offer 
their employees at least some part of their compensation package in the 
form of stock options . . . how should you weigh the tradeoffs between the 
two forms of compensation—whether you’re choosing between two different 
job offers or a company has offered you a choice of salary packages[?]”); 
William Baldwin, Should You Take A Bigger Salary Or Employee Stock 
Options?, FORBES (June 29, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2017/06/13/how-much-are-those-
employee-options-worth/#c61798564cfa [https://perma.cc/77P6-28AY] 
(describing the stories of employees who are confronting these decisions).  







FhWDhcL3l4SyJ9 [https://perma.cc/6T3X-LMM7] (reporting data on 
startup employee departure patterns “consistent with four-year vesting 
schedules commonly seen among startups and private companies” and 
noting that “[i]t’s common for vesting schedules to include a one-year cliff, 
and strategic behavior would suggest that employees consider voluntarily 
leaving startups when they reach this milestone [as suggested by the 
data]”); see also Jay Bhatti, How Startups Should Deal with Cliff Vesting 
For Employees, BUS. INSIDER (May 7, 2011), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/everything-you-need-to-know-about-cliff-
vesting-2011-5 [https://perma.cc/Q5DB-XZ24] (“I have known people who 
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equity that can result in severe financial consequences.124 
Indeed, the description of equity compensation arrangements 
as merely a benefit is not only inaccurate from a legal and 
economic standpoint but also does not coincide with the way 
most employees view these arrangements.125    
Taken together, neither of the SEC’s arguments fit within 
the broader regulatory framework that governs securities 
offerings to employees, nor do they recognize the economic 
realities behind these arrangements. The SEC’s explanations, 
therefore, fall short of providing an adequate basis for crafting 
and guiding the disclosure regime that governs securities 
offerings to employees. The following Section offers 
alternative reasoning to guide the regulation of equity-based 





join startups early, but only stay a little over a year and then go join another 
startup. They call it hedging their bets.”); Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting 
VC04: “One of the things that I’ve seen a lot of, particularly over the last 
few years, are what I call “cliff jumpers.” Where they get past there one year 
vesting cliff . . . and then they jump out of the company.”); Interviews, supra 
note 29 (quoting E02: “there was a period where I was not that happy with 
my job and I considered looking around and I thought, well what’s the 
timing, I should wait until at least the first year when some stuff vests.”). 
124 See Aran, supra note 4, at 1267 (explaining the tax implications of 
leaving a startup and exercising stock options); see also Cable, supra note 5 
at 617 (discussing the case of Good Technology employees); Matt Levine, 
Work for Uber, Wind Up in Debt, BLOOMBERG OPINION (December 12, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-12-13/work-for-uber-
wind-up-in-debt [https://perma.cc/5ELQ-5CXT] (bringing the story of two 
Uber employees who took on debt to exercise stock options). 
125 Out of 1,114 college-educated technology workers who were asked 
to complete the sentence “[m]ost of my friends and colleagues think about 
equity-based compensation from a start-up as a form of ___,” only 22% (244 
respondents) answered “bonus or benefit.” 24% (272 respondents) chose 
“investment or savings plan”; 13% (145 respondents) chose “salary, wage or 
pay”; 21% (236 respondents) chose “incentive or incentive alignment 
device”; 7% (80 respondents) chose “lottery ticket”, and 12% (137 
respondents) chose “They never think about it.” See Aran, supra note 30. 
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C. Alternative Reasoning for Regulating Start-up 
Equity Compensation 
The rationales offered by the SEC for the disclosure 
provisions of Rule 701 are unpersuasive, revealing a need for 
a more contextualized understanding of the equity 
compensation market. This Section argues that rather than 
comparing employees to the paradigmatic case of the non-
accredited capital investor and debating whether employees 
need access to the firm’s financial statements or not, the SEC’s 
policy should take into account the unique attributes of the 
start-up equity market. Unlike that of public exchanges, this 
market is inefficient and illiquid, and information cannot be 
assumed to be reflected in equity’ prices.  
1. Employees are (Generally) Unsophisticated 
Investors  
The starting point for the discussion about employees’ need 
for information lies with the recognition that, in general, 
rank-and-file employees are unsophisticated investors.126 As 
such, smart and talented as they are, they typically lack the 
skills and knowledge needed to properly read and analyze 
 
126 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1952) (“Absent . . . 
a showing of special circumstances, employees are just as much members of 
the investing ‘public’ as any of their neighbors in the community.”). Ample 
economic research on employee stock options in public companies has 
demonstrated that employees’ evaluation of equity-based compensation 
does not accord with financial models and tends to fall on the overvaluation 
side. See, e.g., Oliver G. Spalt, Probability Weighting and Employee Stock 
Options, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1085, 1087 (2013) (explaining 
employees’ preference for stock options using prospect theory’s probability 
weighting function which holds that people tend to overreact to small 
probability events and underreact to large probabilities); see also Kevin F. 
Hallock & Craig A Olson, The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive 
Employees 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper 11950, 2006) 
(demonstrating that most employees value their options at a value greater 
than their Black-Scholes value); Cynthia E. Devers et. al., The Effects of 
Endowment and Loss Aversion in Managerial Stock Option Valuation, 50 
ACAD. MGMT J. 191, 192 (2007) (arguing that endowment effect and loss 
aversion explain employees’ exercise decisions).  
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financial statements. The employees interviewed for this 
research had either not viewed their employer’s financial 
statements, or did not know what to make of them.127 
Likewise, the lawyers interviewed for this research held that 
very few employees use and find value in the opportunity to 
access these documents.128 From the perspective of some 
employers, employees who ask to review the financial 
statements are signaling that they are planning to leave the 
company.129  
The notion that employees need such information 
resembles a concept that underlies much of the early legal 
theory on securities regulation— that mandatory disclosure of 
financial information enables small, unsophisticated 
investors to make well-informed investment decisions.130 The 
problem with this premise, as the law and economics theorists 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel put it, is that it is just 
“as unsophisticated as the investors it is supposed to 
protect.”131  
 
127 See Interviews, supra note 29 (referencing E03 accessing the firm’s 
financial statements via intranet portal but having “no idea what they 
meant”); see also Interviews, supra note 29 (referencing E05 and E08 
explaining that despite having access to Rule 701 disclosures, they never 
attempted to read them).  
128 See Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting L04: “I think most employees 
are not gonna take advantage of looking at this information. You will have 
some former employees who sometimes want to get access to that 
information and you can imagine why, especially if they’re going to go work 
for a competitor.”).  
129 Id. 
130 John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a 
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 723 (1984) (“Easy as it is 
today to criticize the original premise of the federal securities laws—i.e., 
that mandatory disclosure would enable the small investor to identify and 
invest in higher quality and lower risk securities—such criticism does not 
take us very far because its target has shifted.”).  
131 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory 
Disclosure and Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 694 (1984) 
(explaining that the idea that unsophisticated investors rely on financial 
disclosure in their investment decisions disregards the role of the capital 
market in reflecting information through prices, and positing that 
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Easterbrook and Fischel go so far as to suggest that 
unsophisticated investors are “simply made worse off if 
information is foisted on them” because rather than taking a 
“free ride” on a price that is determined by the actions of 
informed traders, they must read the information or discard 
it without it being of any use to them.132 Some scholars have 
criticized Easterbrook and Fischel for underplaying the role 
investor protection plays in the mandatory disclosure 
regime.133 However, the basic insight that unsophisticated 
investors do not benefit directly from receiving financial 
disclosures, but rather indirectly through the price-setting 
function of the market, is widely accepted and stems directly 
from the semi-strong form of the efficient market 
hypothesis.134  
In the context of private companies, the problem is that 
employees’ attempts to “free-ride” on the information that is 
provided to the market by the investment decisions of 
sophisticated investors are doomed to fail. Unlike the public 
securities markets, the market for start-up stock is restricted 
 
unsophisticated investors have no reason to sort through the detailed 
information in the financial statements because by the time such investors 
make their investment decisions, the market has already absorbed the 
information).  
132 Id. 
133 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. 
L. REV. 407, 414 (2002) (“[A]s any law student who has taken a course in 
securities regulation knows, the Congress . . . gave every appearance of 
taking the need for government-imposed investor protection quite 
seriously.”); see also Coffee, supra note 130, at 723 (“[S]uch criticism does 
not take us very far because its target has shifted. The securities markets 
have evolved significantly since the 1930’s . . . .”); John J.A. Burke, Re-
Examining Investor Protection in Europe and the US, 16 E. LAW J. 1, 8 
(2009) (“the legislative evidence of any sophisticated legal regime supports 
a contrary viewpoint and argument.”).   
134 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Firm Specific Information and the 
Federal Securities Laws: A Doctrinal, Etymological, and Theoretical 
Critique, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1451 (1994) (“[Easterbrook & Fischel’s] 
statement is, of course, the classical definition of the semi-strong form of the 
ECMH [Efficient Market Hypothesis]. Thus federal mandatory disclosure 
cannot be defended as protecting investors because, under the ECMH, they 
do not need protection.”). 
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and the deals made by sophisticated investors do not provide 
a straightforward indication that can facilitate price 
discovery. That is because, as discussed in the following 
Section, the securities purchased by sophisticated investors 
are different from those earned by employees. 
 
2. The Complexity of Startups’ Capital Structures 
Unlike public companies’ stock, venture capital-backed 
firms—especially those that have undergone multiple 
financing rounds and reached ultra-high valuations—tend to 
have multiple classes of shares, each with different economic 
values.135 Employees’ incentives derive their value from the 
company’s common stock. The common stockholders have a 
residual claim against the assets and cash flows of the firm. 
Venture capital investments, in contrast, are structured as 
convertible preferred stock, wherein the investors acquire 
shares with superior cash flow and control rights.136 Investors’ 
conversion rights allow them to enjoy a dual position: in 
downside scenarios, such as a bankruptcy or acquisition for a 
low sum, their investments have a debt-like priority—
meaning that they will be paid in full before any payments are 
made to the common stockholders.137 If the company is sold for 
a price below the sum owed to the preferred stockholders, the 
common stockholders will not participate in the proceeds.  In 
favorable scenarios such as an acquisition for a large sum or 
 
135 See generally William Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, Squaring 
Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2019) 
(manuscript at 2–3), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955455 
[https://perma.cc/7KCJ-4KLG] (“Unlike public companies, who generally 
have a single class of common equity, VC-backed companies typically create 
a new class of equity every 12 to 24 months when they raise money . . . . 
Deciphering the financial structure of these companies is difficult . . . .”); 
Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 14) (describing startups’ growing complexity over 
time).   
136 See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 135, at 3.  
137 See id. 
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an IPO, the preferred shareholders can convert their shares 
into common stock and fully participate in the upside as 
common stockholders.138  
The primary characteristic of preferred stock is called 
liquidation preference, meaning that upon a sale or 
liquidation of the company, holders of preferred stock are 
entitled to receive a fixed amount of the proceeds of the sale 
or liquidation before any payments to holders of common 
stock. The most common form of liquidation preference is 
called “1x non-participating liquidation preference” and gives 
the preferred stockholders the right to receive back the 
amount invested before any proceeds from the sale or 
liquidation may be paid to common stockholders. Numerous 
variations of liquidation preferences are used in venture 
capital financing. For example, some preferences give the 
preferred stockholders the right to receive accrued dividends 
in addition to the price paid for the preferred stock. 
Occasionally, the preferred stockholders receive the right to 
receive a fixed amount above their cost (up to two or three 
times their cost) before any payments are made to common 
stockholders (namely, “multiple x liquidation preferences”). 
Another variation involves a participation right that allows 
the preferred stockholders, after receiving their liquidation 
preference, to share in the remaining proceeds with the 
common stockholders as if they had converted their shares to 
common (“participating preferred”). Such participating 
preferred shares yet again may exhibit another variation of 
being “capped” to various degrees. Holders of a series of 
preferred stock with a capped participation right will receive 
a distribution equal to their initial liquidation preference and 
then also share in the proceeds on a pro-rata basis with 
common stockholders until the agreed-upon return cap is 
reached. The cap is typically set at a multiple of the price per 
share paid by the investor with the amount of the initial 
preference typically being included in the cap. 
Other terms that preferred shareholders can negotiate 
with the company include voting rights, such as the right to 
 
138 Id.  
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elect a certain number of directors, the right to veto activities 
that significantly change the capital structure of the firm, and 
anti-dilution protections. The latter provisions are designed to 
protect the preferred shareholders from future issuances of 
stock at lower valuations than the valuation used in their 
original investment. The most common form of anti-dilution 
protection is called a “ratchet” and comes in either severe 
(“full”) or moderate (“weighted average”) form. A ratchet is a 
form of price protection that adjusts the conversion ratio from 
preferred to common stock and allocates additional shares to 
the investor if the IPO offering price falls below a pre-agreed-
upon threshold.139 Typically these provisions seek to 
guarantee that investors would “at least break even in 
IPOs.”140 However, occasionally, investors go further and 
negotiate some guaranteed return.141 
Each financing round typically leads to the creation of a 
new series or class of shares senior to, or on parity with, the 
earlier preferred shareholders. The seniority structure, also 
known as the “preference stack,” determines where each class 
of shares is located in the payout order. The total sum of 
proceeds payable to the various preferred classes before the 
common shareholders receive any money in liquidation is 
called the “aggregate liquidation preference.” With each 
funding round the preference stack becomes more 
complicated, and the aggregate liquidation preference amount 
increases. Understanding how the proceeds will be distributed 
among the various shareholders is often mathematically and 
structurally challenging due to numerous investors holding 
different contractual rights and seniority statuses.  
The rights assigned to each class of preferred shares affect 
the likelihood of different exit scenarios and the distribution 
of cash flows upon an exit. The economic value of each class of 
shares, including the common stock, is therefore responsive to 
 
139 See id. at 17; see also Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: 
Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 603 (2016) 
(discussing the ratchet provision in the context of Square’s IPO).   
140 Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 135, at 17.  
141 See id. 
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the specific terms of each round. As discussed in the following 
Section, the combination of employees’ lack of sophistication 
with start-ups’ complicated capital structures increases the 
likelihood of employees’ overvaluing their equity incentives.    
3. Price Signaling and Overvaluation in Start-up 
Equity Markets  
Most employees do not understand what liquidation 
preferences are and how they might influence the value of 
their equity grants.142 Signals such as obtaining a high 
valuation or raising large sums of venture capital may 
increase the company’s attraction regardless of their actual 
impact on employee compensation.143 For example, employees 
tend to view an offer from a start-up that has raised large 
sums of venture capital money as more attractive than an 
otherwise identical offer from a start-up that has raised less 
from venture capital firms (suggesting that they do not 
understand the debt-like properties of venture capital 
finance).144  
 
142 See Interviews, supra note 29 (referencing F05 assessing that only 
a small fraction of employees who are veterans of other startups ask about 
the capital structure). See also Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting VC02: “I 
think most employees don’t have any idea . . . . They just wouldn’t have the 
tool set to know how to evaluate what the actual financial implication of 
structure is.”); Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting L04: “I would say most 
employees don’t fully appreciate the preferred versus common stock 
structure.”). 
143 See id. (quoting VC02: “My guess is, if you talk to employees and you 
gave them two identical offers, one with a company at five hundred million 
and one with a company at a billion, even with a punitive structure, my 
guess is psychologically they would assume the billion dollar company is 
doing better and therefore a better value proposition even though it has 
double the price today.”). 
144 A sample of 1,114 college-educated technology workers were asked: 
“All else equal, including the companies’ valuations and cash reserves, 
which equity-based compensation offer is more valuable—an offer from a 
start-up that has raised more money from venture capital investors or an 
offer from a start-up that has raised less?” Only 18% (200) answered 
correctly, i.e., that the offer from the start-up that has raised less is more 
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Due to employees’ lack of relevant financial proficiency, 
and given the properties of the private securities market, 
when employees attempt to “free-ride” on information 
regarding the price per share paid by sophisticated investors, 
they typically overvalue their compensation’s worth.145 
Employees misguidedly assume that all the shares of a single 
company have similar value and therefore infer that the value 
of their compensation is proportionate to their ownership 
stake.146 This gap between the perceived and the fair market 
 
valuable; 53% (588) replied that the more valuable offer is the one made by 
a start-up that has raised more venture capital investments; 16% (175) 
answered “don’t know”, and 14% (151) responded that the offers are of 
similar value. The result suggests that employees do not understand that 
venture capital investors typically get their investment money back first 
when a company is sold. See Aran, supra note 30. 
145 See Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options—Golden Goose or 
Trojan Horse? 107 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107, 183 (2019) (“One of the main 
problems with unicorn firm employee stock option plans is that employees 
are misinformed about their rights and the status of the company.”). 
Therese H. Maynard et. al. further explain that:  
[T]he equity incentive value of a company’s common stock, 
as junior equity security, takes into account the effect of the 
priority rights and powers of the preferred stock 
. . . . Consequently, the value of the common stock is usually 
substantially discounted from the per-share price of the 
preferred stock. In many cases, the discount is 80 percent to 
90 percent off the price paid by investors in the most recent 
issuance of preferred stock. 
THERESE H. MAYNARD ET. AL., BUSINESS PLANNING: FINANCING THE START-UP 
BUSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING 342–43 (2018); see also Scott 
Belsky, A Founder-Turned-Venture-Capitalist Reveals How to Not Get 
Trampled by a Unicorn Startup if You’re an Employee with Stock Options, 
MEDIUM (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-employees-
should-know-about-stock-options-before-they-work-for-startups-2017-1 
[https://perma.cc/2K3S-82V4] (“[M]y concern [is] that employees (and 
founders of acquihire/acquisition targets) don’t understand how the capital 
structure of later-stage private companies can impact the true value of their 
compensation and outcome.”).  
146 See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 135, at 7 (“Many employees 
use post-money valuation as a reference when valuing their common stock 
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value of a start-up’s common stock tends to grow over time 
because later series of shares tend to have superior rights 
compared with those of previous rounds, and are thus more 
valuable.147  
The problem is most prevalent amongst the so-called 
“unicorns” (private companies with reported valuations of $1 
billion or more). Closing a round of financing that values a 
start-up at a billion dollars or more provides the firm with 
added visibility due to press coverage and is generally 
considered to be a reputational boost. Because equity-
compensated employees pay attention to media reports about 
start-up valuations, companies are incentivized to inflate 
their valuation even at the price of providing extensive 
downside protections to late-stage investors.148 As 
 
or option grants, which can lead them to dramatically overestimate their 
wealth.”); see also Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting VC02: “I think for most 
rank and file employees, all they will ever hear is a billion dollars and they 
will do the math in their head and they will say, ‘Okay, I own one percent 
of the company, so therefore whatever, I have ten million dollars now of 
implied value in this company.’”); Connie Loizos, Employees Wise Up, 
TECHCRUNCH (July 17, 2015), 
https://techcrunch.com/2015/07/17/employees-wise-
up/?_ga=2.13951476.294674010.1520981441-126147202.1517863110 
[https://perma.cc/262N-9QCT] (citing VC investor Stacey Bishop: “I think a 
lot of employees think, ‘I have 20,000 shares and therefore [my holdings] 
are worth X.’”).  
147 See  Keith C. Brown & Kenneth W. Wiles, Opaque Financial 
Contracting and Toxic Term Sheets in Venture Capital, 28 J. APPLIED CORP. 
FIN. 72, 73 (2016) (“[P]otential investors in subsequent funding rounds will 
almost certainly pressure the firm to offer them similar or even more 
favorable terms than those provided earlier investors . . . .”); see also Gornall 
& Strebulaev, supra note 135 at 3 (“[P]referred shares that were issued 
early frequently junior to preferred shares issued more recently.”).  
148 Brown & Wiles support this notion in stating that: 
[A]chieving unicorn status is now considered to be such an 
important event for many market participants—if only for 
the public relations, marketing, and recruiting benefits . . . 
that companies appear to be pursuing it as a goal in itself 
. . . in their quest to reach unicorn status, managers at some 
companies may have the incentive (or otherwise feel 
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demonstrated by recent empirical research on the financial 
structure of American unicorns—the magnitude of the 
overvaluation is striking.149  
William Gornall and Ilya Strebulaev have collected 
information on the financial structure of 135 US unicorns. By 
accounting for the specific cash flow and control rights 
attached to each class of shares in every company, the two 
were able to use the share price in the latest round of 
financing to reverse-engineer the fair market value of the 
company’s equity (both preferred and common shares). As 
could be expected, their research reveals that all unicorns are 
overvalued. That is to say, the post-money valuation in the 
latest financing round (“reported valuation”) is higher than 
the fair market value of the company. The extent of the 
overvaluation is, nonetheless, astonishing. On average, the 
unicorns are overvalued by 48%, and the common shares of 
these companies are overvalued by 56%.150  
More specifically, Gornall and Strebulaev demonstrate 
that contractual rights assigned to the preferred shares, that 
are virtually invisible to employees under the current 
 
pressured) to manipulate the market valuation by 
acquiescing to complicated and onerous financing conditions 
that enable them to attract a sufficient amount of new 
capital.  
Brown & Wiles supra note 147, at 72. Some of the lawyers and venture 
capital investors interviewed for this research share this concern. See 
Interviews, supra note 29 (referencing L02 describing that having a 
“‘unicorn”‘ valuation sends out a signal to employees, customers, and 
suppliers. The board and the founders need to make a tradeoff between the 
financing terms and the valuation. Typically, the investors and funders care 
deeply about the terms, however, when companies are between a rock and 
a hard place, sometimes they will rather compromise on bad terms to 
preserve a high valuation); see also Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting 
VC02: “There’s no question in my mind that the competition for employees 
is what drives a lot of this behavior.”). 
149 Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 135, at 1. 
150 Id. Gornall and Strebulaev define a company’s overvaluation “as the 
ratio of the post-money valuation to the implied fair value [by their model,]” 
and common stock’s overvaluation “as the ratio of the most recent round’s 
share price to the fair value of a common share.” Id. at 14.  
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disclosure regime, have a dramatic influence on the value of 
the common stock. For example, if a company is raising $100 
million at a post-money valuation of $1 billion, a shift from the 
standard liquidation preference of 1x to a 1.25x liquidation 
preference  increases the overvaluation of the common stock 
from 28% to 43% (the shift meant that instead of receiving 
100% of the dollar amount of their investment before the 
common stock is paid, the preferred shareholders receive 
125% that amount). A shift to 2x liquidation preference (200% 
of the dollar amount of the investment) further increases the 
overvaluation of the common stock to 109%.151  
Under the same conditions, if the new investors receive 
non-capped participation rights (the right to receive only the 
dollar amount of their investment and then participate in the 
residual distribution along with the common stockholders), 
the common stock will be overvalued by 56%.152 A 
participation right with a 2.5x cap (the right to choose 
between receiving up to 250% of the investment sum and 
converting to common stock) lowers the overvaluation of the 
common stock to 53%.153 Likewise, downside protections such 
as conversion veto rights and ratchets, which are quite 
common in late-stage financing,154 have a dramatic impact on 
common stock overvaluation.155  
 
151 Id. at 7.  
152 Id.    
153 Id. 
154 According to a recent report by the law firm Fenwick and West, that 
examined US unicorn financings deals in 2017 and first half of 2018, these 
contractual terms are quite prevalent. Thus, 30% of 2017 financing deals 
included automatic conversion veto rights (36% in the first half of 2018), 
and 16% included ratchet provisions (12% in the first half of 2018). See 
CYNTHIA CLARFIELD HESS, ET. AL., FENWICK & WEST,  UNICORN FINANCINGS: 
FIRST HALF 2018 7 (2018). 
155 Gornall and Strebulaev calculate that a 1x IPO ratchet (meaning 
that investors convert their preferred shares to a number of common stock 
shares whose aggregate value, calculated at the IPO price, equals their 
original investment amount) would bring the overvaluation of the common 
stock to 60%. A 1.25x IPO ratchet (which provides a guaranteed return of 
25%) would increase the overvaluation of the common stock to 83%. A veto 
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Gornall and Strebulaev worry that the gap between 
perceived and fair value “can lead [employees] to dramatically 
overestimate their wealth.”156 They conclude that “[b]etter 
reporting would benefit limited partners, employees with 
stock options, and the entire venture capital ecosystem.”157 
Similar calls for reform were made by securities law scholars 
who have cautioned about the lack of sufficient disclosure 
requirements for mature private companies.158  
Part II above establishes that pre-negotiated equity-based 
compensation is a form of investment and that, by and large, 
employees are presumed to need the Securities Act’s 
protection. Part III explores the need for regulatory protection 
in the context of start-up equity compensation: it casts doubt 
on the rationales put forward by the SEC for deregulation and 
argues that employees’ lack of financial proficiency vis-à-vis 
the characteristics of venture-capital financing can generate 
overoptimistic expectations that sophisticated employers can 
exploit to their advantage. The following Part argues that 
unless the broken disclosure system is fixed, information 
asymmetry could adversely affect the efficiency of the start-
up labor market.   
 
right conferring the ability to block an IPO at a price that would not return 
the last-round investment sum, brings the overvaluation of the common 
stock up to 59%. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 135, at 7. 
156 Id. at 4. 
157 Id. at 23. 
158 See Fan, supra note 139, at 604 (calling for enhanced disclosure 
requirements for unicorn companies and stating that “the current 
disclosure regime is woefully inadequate”); see also Alon-Beck, supra note 
145, at 186 (“Perhaps certain private companies, such as unicorns, should 
adhere to the same financial disclosure requirements as public 
companies.”); Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. 179, 221–28 (2012) (discussing the need for scaled disclosure 
requirements due to the emergence of secondary private equity markets); 
Pollman, supra note 135, at 4–5 (“Some scholars have recently begun 
studying unicorns, the largest startups by valuation, and have expressed 
concern about their lack of disclosure and lack of discipline on founders.”). 
Cf., Cable, supra note 5, at 642 (cautioning that “[i]t seems premature, 
however, to pursue any particular reform agenda”).  
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III. CONSEQUENCES OF INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY IN START-UP LABOR MARKETS 
The securities regulation regime has traditionally focused 
almost exclusively on information disclosure in the capital 
markets and overlooked the labor market. However, the 
widespread and growing practice of equity-based 
compensation transformed the relationship between high-
skilled employees and their employers into one that involves 
a significant investment component.159 It is therefore time for 
securities law to catch up with market dynamics and address 
the challenges of human capital investments by employees of 
private issuers. As the first step, this Part of the Article 
repeats a few fundamental securities law conventions about 
disclosure’s role in modern capital markets and discusses the 
adjustments needed to account for the difference between 
financial capital raising transactions and human capital 
raising transactions. 
A. Misallocation of Human Capital 
According to the standard theory of capital market 
regulation, financial disclosure is needed because without it, 
information and incentive problems would hamper the 
efficient allocation of capital through the market.160 The goal 
of securities disclosure is, therefore, not only to protect 
individual investors from fraud, but also to sustain market 
efficiency. As Easterbrook and Fischel stress, “[a]ccurate 
information is necessary to ensure that money moves to those 
who can use it most effectively and that investors make 
optimal choices about the contents of their portfolios. A world 
 
159 See Eisfeldt et al., supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
160 See e.g., Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information 
Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the 
Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405, 407 (2001) 
(“Information and incentive problems impede the efficient allocation of 
resources in a capital market economy. Disclosure and the institutions 
created to facilitate credible disclosure between managers and investors 
play an important role in mitigating these problems.”). 
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with fraud, or without adequate truthful information, is a 
world with too little investment, and in the wrong things to 
boot.” 161  
As with cash, human capital is a scarce resource. In some 
technological districts, such as Silicon Valley, human capital 
is considered scarcer than finacial capital.162 Typically, the 
resource invested in exchange for securities is money. 
However, the definition of “sale” or “sell” under the Securities 
Act is not limited to monetary investments; it encompasses 
“every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest 
in a security, for value.”163 As established in Part II.A above, 
when employees pre-negotiate equity compensation, a sale of 
a security takes place. The primary difference between this 
transaction and the paradigmatic case of capital investment 
is that the value being transferred to the issuer is in the form 
of human capital, not cash. From the employee perspective, 
 
161 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 131, at 673. 
162 See, e.g., Will Gaybrick, Tech’s Ultimate Success: Software 
Developers Are Now More Valuable to Companies Than Money, CNBC (Sept. 
6 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/06/companies-worry-more-about-
access-to-software-developers-than-capital.html [https://perma.cc/G8LU-
RKB3] (reporting the results of a survey by Stripe and Harris Poll according 
to which “[a] majority of companies say lack of access to software developers 
is a bigger threat to success than lack of access to capital”); Eric Ries, 
Foreword, in SCOTT KUPOR, SECRETS OF SAND HILL ROAD: VENTURE CAPITAL 
AND HOW TO GET IT, xi (2019) (“Possibly for the first time in history, we’re 
talent-constrained instead of capital-constrained.”); Vijay Govindarajan et. 
al., Why We Need to Update Financial Reporting for the Digital Era, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (June 8, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/06/why-we-need-to-update-
financial-reporting-for-the-digital-era [https://perma.cc/SFY2-LTBQ] 
(arguing that in digital companies “[f]inancial capital is assumed to be 
virtually unlimited, while certain types of human capital are in short 
supply” and “[t]he CEO’s principal aim therefore is not necessarily to 
judiciously allocate financial capital but to allocate precious scientific and 
human resources to the most promising projects”). 
163 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012); see, e.g., Capital 
Gen. Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7008, 1993 WL 285801 (July 23, 
1993) (Capital General’s “gifting” of securities constituted a sale because it 
was a disposition for value. The “‘value’” arose “by virtue of the creation of 
a public market for the issuer’s securities”).   
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this investment takes the form of an opportunity cost rather 
than out-of-pocket cost.  
The efficient allocation of employees to jobs is a critical 
challenge for economic growth.164 While traditional corporate 
law accounts of the employee-firm relationship see employees 
as fungible, in many fields skilled employees are hard to come 
by and often prove irreplaceable.165 Many employers would 
like to attract skilled workers to build their products and to 
turn their business ideas into reality. In theory, when 
employees are paid in cash only, the firm that most highly 
values the employee’s human capital will offer him or her the 
highest pay, leading to an efficient match.166 A competitive 
model of the labor market further predicts that were wages to 
be cut, employees would leave their jobs and flow toward firms 
 
164 See, e.g., Kevin. M Murphy et. al., The Allocation of Talent: 
Implications for Growth, 106 Q.J. ECON. 503, 504 (1991) (arguing 
theoretically and empirically that “the allocation of talent has significant 
effects on the growth rate of an economy”); see also Muge Adalet McGowan 
& Dan Andrews, Labor Market Mismatch and Labor Productivity: Evidence 
from PIAAC Data, in SKILL MISMATCH IN LABOR MARKETS 200 (Solomon W. 
Polachek et al. eds., 2017) (“In this context, the ability of economies to 
efficiently deploy their existing stock of human capital will take on 
heightened significance in order to combat the slowing growth and rising 
inequality that these projections imply.”).  
165 Pollman, Startup Governance, supra note 135, at 34 (“Traditional 
accounts of employees assume they are fungible and their inputs can be 
easily obtained through market contracts.”). Cf., A.D. AMAR, MANAGING 
KNOWLEDGE WORKERS: UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 7 (2002) 
(“Knowledge organizations should look upon every employee as uniquely 
and extremely complex . . . . the uniqueness of each human being is going to 
be so prominent that theorizing or systematizing it will result in lack of the 
full utilization of one’s potential.”); Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting F04: 
“An employee who leaves [the company] takes with him all the knowledge 
that he has accumulated, which causes massive damage to the company.”). 
166 This is true in theory because it is unlikely that the labor market is 
ever in equilibrium given that supply and demand are dynamic. For our 
purposes, it is safe to assume that the market is always in a state of moving 
toward equilibrium. See e.g., Murphy et al., supra note 164, at 503 (“When 
they are free to do so, people choose occupations that offer them the highest 
returns on their abilities.”).  
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that offer higher wages.167 Theoretically, these flows of 
employees in a competitive market keep compensation in 
rough equilibrium across the labor market—workers are 
supposedly paid equal to the value they contribute to their 
firms.168 
However, once equity compensation is added to the mix, an 
information problem arises, because some portion of the 
employee’s salary is granted in the form of securities—
namely, claims to the firm’s future cash flows. Consequently, 
employees’ ability to choose the best offer of employment is 
clouded by the difficulty of estimating the value of the 
securities offered.  
The founder typically has better knowledge than the 
prospective employee about the firm’s value. The founder also 
has an incentive to overstate this value. The founder can 
artificially inflate the company’s valuation to increase its 
attractiveness to new and existing employees.169 The founder 
can also withhold information regarding financial distress to 
create leeway for the company to overcome a crisis without the 
additional burden of employee departure or renegotiation.170 
 
167 See, e.g., George J. Borjas, Labor Market Equilibrium, in LABOR 
ECONOMICS 145 (7th ed., 2016).  
168 Id. 
169 Sarah Frier & Eric Newcomer, The Fuzzy, Insane Math That’s 
Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech Companies, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 
2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-
insane-math-that-s-creating-so-manybillion-dollar-tech-companies 
[https://perma.cc/GH3P-66SW] (“Here’s the secret to how Silicon Valley 
calculates the value of its hottest companies: The numbers are sort of made-
up. For the most mature startups, investors agree to grant higher 
valuations, which help the companies with recruitment and building 
credibility, in exchange for guarantees that they’ll get their money back first 
if the company goes public or sells.”); see also Interviews, supra note 29 
(quoting VC02: “This competition for employees and this need that the 
CEOs feel . . . I need that stock price to always go up in order for me to be 
able to retain my existing employees and to recruit new ones.”). 
170 See, e.g., Katie Benner, When a Unicorn Start-Up Stumbles, Its 
Employees Get Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/technology/when-a-unicorn-start-up-
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As one of the founders interviewed for this research put it: “my 
main challenge as an entrepreneur is keeping employees’ 
morale high despite whatever difficulties that the company is 
experiencing. It’s like being a marine commander leading his 
troops to the battlefield; if I’ll tell them the truth, which is, 
we’re all going to die, they will run away.”171  
Information asymmetry between founders and employees 
is especially acute in start-up labor markets because, in these 
economies, equity incentives tend to play a significant role in 
the compensation of non-executive employees,172 and these 
securities are not priced by an active liquid market.173 When 
employees are compensated with securities they cannot value, 
labor supply elasticity might decrease, as employees may not 
 
stumbles-its-employees-get-hurt.html [https://perma.cc/9WBD-2H87] 
(reporting the case of Good Technology, which was sold for $425 million 
after reaching a private market valuation of $1.1 billion, bringing the value 
of the common stock to 44 cents a share, down from $4.32 a year earlier. 
The company’s financial struggles were downplayed by management in 
communications with employees). 
171 Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting F04); see also Interviews, supra 
note 29 (quoting VC03: “the goal of course is to avoid a situation where an 
employee feels that they’ve been misled or that information has been hidden 
or omitted, and that in some ways they’ve been taken advantage of. It 
happens, and unfortunately those stories perpetuate a mythology that VCs 
are evil or that even management teams are not to be trusted.”). 
172 See, e.g., Jerome S. Engel, Global Clusters of Innovation: Lessons 
from Silicon Valley, 57 CAL. MGMT. REV. 36, 41 (2015) (describing the 
creation of broad-based equity compensation policies to help align the 
economic interests of all employees with the economic interests of investors 
as one of the crucial lessons from the success of Silicon Valley); Ronald J. 
Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A 
Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 877 
(2003) (“Intense incentive compensation for portfolio company founders and 
employees is a fundamental feature of venture capital contracting.”).  
173 The securities that private issuers offer as equity compensation are 
generally restricted, i.e., subject to resale limitations, and the issuer does 
not need to publicly disclose financial information. See supra Part II.C 
(discussing disclosure requirements); see also Exemption for Offers and 
Sales of Securities Pursuant to Certain Compensatory Benefit Plans and 
Contracts Relating to Compensatoin, 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(g)(1) (2018) 
(“Securities issued under this section are deemed to be ‘restricted 
securities.’”).  
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respond to changes in their compensation’s value. This 
incentive to withhold bad news is particularly high in high-
velocity labor markets such as Silicon Valley where employers 
stand to gain significantly by lowering employee mobility.174   
Thus, information asymmetry might prevent employees 
from moving towards their highest-value use, thereby 
misallocating the limited supply of highly-skilled workers in 
the market. The following Section describes another problem 
stemming from information asymmetry—the potential 
breakdown of the market.     
B. Equity Compensation as Lemons Market   
Asymmetric information can cause the market mechanism 
to collapse, a problem known as the “market for lemons.”175 
Consider a situation where half of start-ups offer high-quality 
equity incentives and the other half offer low-quality equity 
incentives. Both employees and founders are rational and 
value these securities based on the information available to 
them. The theory predicts that if employees cannot 
distinguish between the two types of start-ups, founders of 
start-ups with low-quality securities will try to claim that 
their equity incentives are as valuable as the securities offered 
 
174 See Aran, supra note 4, at 1246 n.56 (citing literature on employee 
mobility in Silicon Valley). Evidence of the incentive to Silicon Valley 
employers to engage in legally questionable practices to reduce employee 
mobility is found in a famous antitrust case involving several Silicon Valley 
tech firms, including Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, Pixar, Lucasfilm, 
and eBay, which colluded to refrain from poaching each other’s employees 
to reduce turnover and labor costs. See United States v. Adobe Systems Inc., 
No. 10 CV1629, 2011 WL 10883994, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2011) (action by 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice); United States v. 
Lucasfilm, Inc., No. 10-02220 (RBW), 2011 WL 2636850, at *1 (D.D.C. June 
3, 2011) (action by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice); see 
also In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172–73, 
1175 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013) (civil litigation).  
175 The seminal article by George Akerlof depicted the consequences of 
information asymmetry in the used car market. See generally George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism 84 Q. J. ECON 488 (1970). 
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by the other start-ups.176 The theory further predicts that 
realizing this possibility, employees will value all start-up 
equity grants at an average level.177 Consequently, the labor 
market will rationally undervalue some equity incentives and 
overvalue some others relative to the information available to 
the founders. 
Hence, an adverse selection problem arises. Because 
equity-based compensation is central to startups’ culture,178 
founders of high-quality start-ups would probably still offer 
equity grants to employees, but these grants would play a 
lesser role in the company’s recruitment strategy. Instead of 
offering a large volume of high-quality securities to employees 
at a discount, these founders will attract employees with cash 
and other sought-after benefits, and use their high-quality 
equity to raise financing from sophisticated investors who can 
better estimate its value.179 Possibly, when facing the tradeoff 
 
176 Cf. id. at 488 and 495 ( “[T]here is incentive for sellers to market 
poor quality merchandise [to be dishonest]” and “the presence of people who 
wish to pawn bad wares as good wares tends to drive out the legitimate 
business.”). 
177 See id. at 490.  
178 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
179 This result is not necessarily a bad outcome—most economists think 
that employees are inefficient suppliers of capital compared with 
sophisticated investors such as venture capitalists, and therefore equity 
compensation should not be encouraged. See, e.g., Brian Hall & Kevin 
Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options 11, 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 9784, 2003). Economic analysis points out 
that the value of equity compensation to a rational employee should be 
lower than the value of the same securities to a sophisticated investor 
because employees cannot diversify their investment or protect themselves 
through hedging or other techniques. Id. However, if one believes that there 
is value in equity compensation, then one should care about asymmetric 
information and its effect on labor market dynamics. Among the arguments 
offered in the literature in favor of equity compensation are the potential 
for better distribution of the wealth created by start-up companies, see 
JOSEPH R. BLASI ET AL., supra note 4, at 195; better motivation for the 
employees, see Booth, supra note 63, at 273; Corey Rosen, The Record of 
Employee Ownership, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1990, at 39, 41, and a better form 
of protection for research and development and human capital investments 
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between obtaining a high valuation and protecting the value 
of the common stock,180 founders would be more likely to 
choose the former.181 Gradually, the value of the securities 
offered as compensation to employees across the industry 
would decline, and the attractiveness of equity incentives for 
recruitment purposes would diminish. Consequently, 
employees will adjust their cash salary expectations, and the 
cost of starting a new venture might rise.182  
 
by the company (compared to non-compete agreements) that allows for 
efficient allocation of skilled employees in the start-up labor market. See 
Aran, supra note 4, at 1273–78.  
180 Regarding the tradeoff between terms and valuation see supra 
Section III.C.3.  
181 Founders are incentivized to protect the value of the common stock 
because they too hold this class of shares. However, founders can and often 
do extract value from the company via management incentive plans, loans 
and other transactions that create a wedge between them and the 
employees. See infra Section IV.C.   
182 Some of the interviewees of this research view it as a fair description 
of eroding attraction of equity compensation in Silicon Valley. See, e.g., 
Interviews, supra note 29 (referencing VC01 reckoning that in the past the 
expectation was that a senior employee should be able to buy a house after 
a successful IPO and a rank and file employee should be able to buy a car. 
Whereas today, the equity stakes are less significant.); id. (quoting F01: “I 
think employees are getting less stocks than they used to than in the early 
days. It seemed like it’s a way to defer cash.”); Interviews, supra note 29 
(citing F03 estimating that nowadays startup employees view equity as a 
bonus, and it no longer provides a significant incentive for recruiting 
purposes); Interviews, supra note 29 (referencing VC03 estimating that due 
to influx of venture capital in some markets such as Silicon Valley, New 
York, and Boston—start-up employees in these areas receive competitive 
cash salaries, and therefore in these markets, equity compensation is no 
longer a significant factor in recruiting efforts). Survey respondents explain 
their preference for cash only compensation schemes in the following terms: 
“Based on my experiences, equity-based compensation has never really paid 
off for me. While I used to view it as a lottery ticket, I now view it as more 
of a liability. When I negotiate salary with a new employer these days, I ask 
them not how much equity they can give me, rather I ask them how much 
equity can I give up or give back to them in exchange for a higher salary”; 
“I have participated in start-ups that offered equity and failed. A bird in the 
hand is better than two in the bush”; “Start-up stock is normally only good 
for wall-papering”. See Aran, supra note 30.  
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This problem could be solved if employees used an 
intermediary to help them understand the economic value of 
the equity grants.183 However, start-ups are typically not 
covered by rating agencies or buy-side analysts,184 and most 
employees do not consult with experts before making their 
decisions regarding equity compensation.185  
Likewise, in theory, founders of top-quality companies can 
voluntarily disclose financial information to convince 
prospective employees that their securities are of greater 
value than the market baseline. Those companies will 
presumably enjoy a recruiting advantage, which will force 
other above-average companies to follow suit in a process of 
“unraveling.”186 However, in practice, very few companies 
 
183 See Frank Rose, THE ECONOMICS, CONCEPT, AND DESIGN OF 
INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES: A THEORETIC APPROACH 70 (1999) 
(“Intermediaries may help to overcome market failures caused by 
informational asymmetries.”).  
184 See e.g., Al Schneider, How To Value Your Startup, SOCALTECH 
(May 27, 2008), https://www.socaltech.com/articles/how-to-value-your-
startup/a-00035.html [https://perma.cc/8N53-MSW5] (“There are no ‘rating 
agencies’ (as in the world of bond investments) that offer third party risk 
assessment. There are no widely followed ‘buy side’ analysts (as in some 
public equity markets) who package critical market, financial and other 
analyses.”). 
185 Out of 182 employees who reported being offered equity-based 
compensation (not through workplace pension or retirement plan) in the 
past—only 20% (37 respondents) reported seeking professional advice (from 
a lawyer, financial adviser, etc.); 50% (91 respondents) reported that they 
had not consulted with anyone before making their decision, an additional 
5% (10 respondents) reported that they had only looked up for information 
online, and 24% (44 respondents) reported seeking unprofessional advice 
from a friend, family member, or colleague. See Aran, supra note 30.   
186 The term “unraveling” is first used by Professor Viscusi who 
provides an example in the context of labor markets where firms with above-
average probabilities of successful job outcomes will invest in quality 
certification to distinguish themselves from the industry. W. Kip Viscusi, A 
Note on “Lemons” Markets with Quality Certification, 9 BELL J. ECON. 277, 
278 (1978). In theory, if a seller possesses better information about the 
quality of their goods and services than consumers do and there is zero cost 
to verifiably disclose it, sellers will always disclose simply because rational 
consumers will infer nondisclosure as having the lowest quality. See 
 
4_2019.3_ARAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2020  4:44 PM 
No. 3:867] MAKING DISCLOSURE WORK 923 
adopt full transparency of cap table information, including 
waterfall analysis and valuation information.187  
As the theory predicts, for unraveling to take place, the 
disclosure needs to be costless and credible. In practice, 
disclosure involves the costs of preparing and disseminating 
the information, and the cost of revealing sensitive 
information.188 Moreover, the credibility of voluntary 
disclosure is questioned due to the lack of verification and 
monitoring mechanisms,189 and the absence of a penalty for 
dishonesty.190 Litigation between startups and employees is 
 
Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private 
Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J. LAW & ECON. 461, 465 (1981); see 
also Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems 
and Applications 12 BELL J. ECON. 380, 388–89 (1981). 
187 Jeron Paul, Will Cap Table Transparency Help Your Startup?, 
CAPSHARE BLOG (June 2, 2015), https://www.capshare.com/blog/will-cap-
table-transparency-help-your-startup/ [https://perma.cc/8J7A-9FBK] 
(assessing that “most companies” provide employees only with the legal 
paperwork of the equity grant which includes “number of shares, vesting 
plan details, vesting trigger information, exercise details, and expiration 
dates”; some companies disclose “the fully-diluted ownership percentage of 
the shares at the time of the grant”; “a few” companies reveal to employees 
“their fully-diluted ownership percentage”; and “even fewer companies” 
provide more than this). 
188 Because disclosure is not costless, it is rational for firms to withhold 
unfavorable information below a critical threshold disclosure level. See 
Robert E. Verrecchia, Discretionary Disclosure, 5 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 180 
–82 (1983) (demonstrating an equilibrium of partial disclosure where firms 
that possess positive information valued above the disclosure cost threshold 
will choose to disclose it). The existence of legitimate reason not to disclose 
information prevents buyers from interoperating silence as a negative sign 
and thus impedes the unraveling result. See Robert H. Gertner, Disclosure 
and Unraveling, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
605, 608 (Peter Newman ed., 1999); see also Steven Shavell, Acquisition and 
Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20, 23, 25 (1994); 
Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. ECON. 97, 154–55 
(2001).  
189 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 131, at 674–75, 677 
(discussing verification and inspection costs in securities markets).  
190 Easterbrook & Fischel argue that a rule against fraud without an 
additional mandatory disclosure rule “is most beneficial when enforcement 
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rare and reputational damage from false disclosures is 
negligible.191  
Thus, the lack of mandatory disclosure may adversely 
affect the startup labor market by diminishing employees’ 
trust in this compensation device and, consequently, their 
willingness to accept lower cash salaries in return for equity 
incentives. The following Section describes another reason for 
these dynamics—the agency costs imposed by preferred 
shareholders control of the board.          
C. Agency Costs and Human Capital Expropriation  
Information asymmetry in the equity compensation 
domain might also cause an agency problem: the conflict of 
interest that arises in any relationship where one party is 
expected to act in another’s best interests.192 Typically, in the 
context of capital investments, equity compensation is 
regarded as a means to mitigate the agency problem between 
 
costs are low.” Id. at 679. They also argue that “[m]ere [voluntary] disclosure 
would be enough if the rule against fraud were perfectly enforced, but it is 
not.” Id. at 683. It follows that in the context of employment relationship 
where employees are often reluctant to sue, the antifraud provisions of the 
securities laws would not suffice to mitigate information asymmetry 
problems. See also Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture 
Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 1000–01 (2006) 
(arguing that common stockholders including employees are unlikely to sue 
venture capital nominated board members due to difficulty to finance such 
litigation).   
191 See e.g., Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting E04: “I wish I could say 
that there are reputational implications for bad behavior in Silicon Valley, 
but I do not think that’s true. There would always be a new sucker. Silicon 
Valley is no longer a small community.”). 
192 The traditional analysis of the agent-principal problem generally 
views employees as the agents and shareholders as the principals. See 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 
(1976) (“[T]he problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if he were 
maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general.”). 
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capital investors and management.193 However, to employee-
equity holders, the agency problem is the reverse—employees 
are principals whereas the management and board of 
directors are agents.  
Equity-compensated employees typically do not play an 
active role in the company’s decisionmaking process.194 
Strategic decisions are made by the board of directors, which 
both the founders and the venture capital investors appoint, 
and the management carries out these decisions.195 
Consequently, once employees have accepted equity 
 
193 In the venture capital-backed company, see generally Ronald J. 
Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons From the American 
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076–92 (2003) (discussing agency costs 
between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs); Gilson & Schizer, supra 
note 172, at 880; Fried & Ganor, supra note 190, at 971; Alon-Beck, supra 
note 145, at 124–25.  
194 As holders of stock options or RSUs, employees do not enjoy voting 
rights. Even employees who have exercised their stock options and own 
shares typically do not tend to use their voting rights because their equity 
stake is too small to have significant influence. Employee-equity holders 
also sometimes assign their voting rights away in a proxy, since these 
shares are viewed as having been granted almost exclusively for economic 
reasons, and not as intended to influence decisionmaking. Theoretically, 
employees can coordinate their voting behavior to gain more influence, but 
they rarely do so. See DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE MATTERS: A CLOSER LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND 
THEIR CONSEQUENCES 149–51 (Jeanne Glasser et al. eds.,  2011) (discussing 
the differences in employee representation at the board level between U.S. 
and Europe (mostly German) companies and reviewing the relevant 
empirical literature). Cf., Paris Martineau, Amazon Employees Try a New 
Form of Activism, as Shareholders, WIRED (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-employees-try-new-activism-
shareholders/ [https://perma.cc/M5L2-2KHA] (describing some Amazon 
employees’ coordinated effort to influence the company’s policy on climate 
change issues via proxy proposal. Stating that “the move could be a 
harbinger of a new genre of activism for stock-laden tech workers . . . . ”).   
195 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 190, at 987–88; see also Steven E. 
Boschner & Amy L. Simmerman, The Venture Capital Board Member’s 
Survival Guide: Handling Conflicts Effectively While Wearing Two Hats, 41 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2016) (“It is not unusual for an early-stage venture-
backed company to have a board composed of the corporation’s CEO and 
otherwise general partners from the corporation’s funding venture firms-in 
effect potentially no independent and disinterested directors . . . .”).  
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compensation, self-interested founders and venture-capital-
appointed directors occasionally have an incentive to make 
decisions that expropriate employees’ human capital and 
minority equity stake.196 
Notably, the corporate governance literature has yet to 
recognize the role of employee-equity holders in the 
governance of the venture capital-backed company.197 The 
traditional framework views the board of directors as the 
organ that monitors  management and mitigates the agency 
problem arising out of the separation of ownership and 
control.198 However, due to the competing duties of venture-
capital-appointed directors to the company and their funds, 
these directors operate with a conflict of interest in situations 
that involve disparity of outcomes between different classes of 
shares. Therefore, in practice, often it is management that 
 
196 See Interviews, supra note 29 (referencing VC02 assessing that 
“boards are quite good at working with legal counsel and, hopefully, doing 
things that appropriately keep them out of trouble,” yet recognizing that 
“employees are not in the room and would learn about the board’s decision 
only in retrospect[,]” a structure that naturally leads to “some 
externalities”); see also Interviews, supra note 29 (citing VC03 describing 
“an emotional bias that comes with the VCs,” which is based on “fear and 
greed[,]” and assessing that “self-aware investors doesn’t put themselves in 
a position where that kind of moral hazard is something that might lead to 
illegal or fiduciary hazard . . . .”); see also Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive 
Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 
TEX. L. REV. 789, 790 (2015) (introducing “the growing field of human capital 
law at the intersections of IP law, contract and employment law, and 
antitrust law” and cautioning against human capital expropriation in these 
domains).  
197 See Pollman, Startup Governance, supra note 135, at 6 n.18 (noting 
that “[S]cholars have largely overlooked the role of non-founder employees 
in startup governance.”). 
198 Jacqueline Garner et al., Boards of Directors: a Literature Review, 
43 MANAGERIAL FIN. 1189, 1189 (2017) (“The board of directors is commonly 
described as an institution to advise and monitor . . . the monitoring 
function is intended to mitigate the classic agency problem between 
managers and shareholders.”). 
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protects the common stockholders from expropriation by the 
board rather than the reverse. 199  
Under Delaware corporate law, the board’s fiduciary duty 
is to maximize value for the long-term benefit of the common 
stockholders,200 but in practice, self-interest and conflicting 
loyalties to the venture fund’s limited partners might very 
well cloud directors’ judgment.201 The interests and risk 
 
199 See, e.g., Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting VC03: “Usually the 
person speaking on behalf of or trying to look out for the common 
shareholders is the CEO because most common shareholders are employees 
or sometimes friend and family investors. And so morally, usually it’s the 
CEO who is saying, ‘Let’s make sure that we’re doing the right thing.’”); see 
also Cable, supra note 5, at 632 (“[E]arly employees have a powerful ally in 
policing VC agency costs—the founder who will initially wield majority 
control and who stands with the employees as common equity holders.”). 
200 Boschner & Simmerman, supra note 195, at 4 (“Corporate directors 
have fiduciary duties of loyalty and of care to stockholders of the company 
on whose board they serve. Significantly, these fiduciary duties tend to run 
primarily to the common stockholders, as the relevant case law views 
preferred stockholder rights as a function of, and protected primarily by, 
contract law—at least where the terms of preferred stock speak to a given 
issue, such as the allocation of proceeds to preferred stockholders in a sale 
of the company.”); see also Pollman, Startup Governance, supra note 135, at 
32.  
201 See Boschner & Simmerman, supra note 195, at 3 (“[C]onflicts of 
interest are never very far away in a venture-backed company”); see 
generally D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 315, 316 (2005) (analyzing potential conflicts between venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs in exit scenarios); William W. Bratton, 
Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 892–94 (2002) (explaining the use of preferred stock 
by venture capitalists); see also In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 
46–54 (Del. Ch. 2013) (discussing the personal and institutional conflict of 
interests of the VC-appointed directors that voted for the litigated merger 
deal and reviewing relevant literature); Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN 
Holding Corp., No. 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *36 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 
2017) (One could “reasonably infer . . . that the directors acted to maximize 
the value of Oak Hill’s Preferred Stock rather than seeking to promote the 
long-term value of the Company for the benefit of the undifferentiated 
equity, and that the resulting transactions were unfair to the Company’s 
common stockholders.”); Mehta v. Mobile Posse, Inc., No. 2018-0355-KSJM, 
2019 WL 2025231, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2019) (in a case involving a sale of 
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tolerance of the limited partners deviates from those of the 
common stockholders and employee option holders.202 
Situations such as “down rounds,” end-stage transactions, and 
compensation decisions, determine how proceeds will be 
distributed among the parties, and as such, they often involve 
a disparity among the various classes of equity holders.  
When founders lose control of the board or are being issued 
non-common stock incentives, the agency problems affecting 
employees intensify.203 These situations are not rare. 
Founders tend to lose board control in advanced financing 
 
a venture capital-backed start-up in which the directors around the board 
table held nearly all of the preferred stock and a majority of the total 
outstanding voting power. The court denied the defendants’ motion for a 
judgment on the pleadings considering the directors’ conflict of interest and 
various technical foot faults in the sale approval).   
202 See Pollman, Startup Governance, supra note 135, at 26 (“VCs and 
founders often diverge with respect to risk level, liquidity needs, and private 
benefits, which are often implicated in critical board-level decisions on 
financings, strategic direction, and exit.”); see also In re Trados Inc., 73 A.3d 
at 49–51 (finding that directors who are also venture capital investors might 
suffer from conflict of interest and citing relevant literature); Calesa 
Assocs., L.P. v. Am. Capital, Ltd., No. 10557-VCG, 2016 WL 770251, at *11 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016) (declining to dismiss a lawsuit by the common 
stockholders against a venture fund and its board representatives arising 
from a recapitalization transaction that increased the venture fund’s 
ownership stake and “squeezed out” the common stock).  
203 See Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting VC03: “The best companies 
and the best CEOs negotiate those carve-out plans so that every employee 
who’s still with the company, if it exits, gets something. The worst CEOs 
only put those plans in place for the senior leadership team.”). On this point, 
a different interviewee noted that: 
[T]ypically what the board of directors does is they create a 
bonus pool equal to some percentage, typically somewhere 
between five and 10 percent of the sale price, and that bonus 
pool is in place to create an incentive for the management 
team to get the deal done in a responsible and appropriate 
manner . . . . It’s getting paid out as a bonus because 
otherwise you’d be discriminating against classes of equity. 
Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting VC04); see also Alon-Beck, supra note 
145, at 141–43 (describing founder-friendly practices that might cause 
disparity between the founders’ interests and those of the common 
stockholders).  
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rounds204 and are often issued private benefits (such as a 
special class of preferred shares, parachute payments, and 
carve-outs) as incentives to cooperate with the preferred 
shareholders.205 
 
204 See Steven N. Kaplan, et al., Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or 
the Horse? Evidence from the Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans 
to Public Companies, 64 J. FIN. 75, 99–103 (2009) (sampling of 50 companies 
that went public, the studies showed that the median number of venture-
capital directors is three, the median number of management directors is 
two, and the median number of outside directors is two). Cf. Brian 
Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Carrots & Sticks: How VCs Induce 
Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1329 
(2013) (“VC board representation tends to increase with new financing 
rounds . . . . [I]n a plurality of firms, neither common shareholders nor VC-
appointed directors ever achieve outright control; the swing vote remains in 
the hands of an independent director.”); see also Brian J. Broughman & 
Jesse M. Fried, Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms that Go Public? 15 
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. (ECGI), Working Paper No. 405, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171237 
[https://perma.cc/GG5Q-4WQA] (measuring founders’ control post-IPO).  
205 See Broughman & Fried, Carrots & Sticks, supra note 204, at 1319 
(reporting that in a sample of 50 acquisitions of Silicon Valley-based start-
ups, in 45% of the deals management received private benefits as incentives 
to accept the deal, and these incentives on average conferred 9% of the deal’s 
value to the entrepreneurial team); see also SCOTT KUPOR, SECRETS OF SAND 
HILL ROAD: VENTURE CAPITAL AND HOW TO GET IT 221–22 (2019) (discussing 
management incentive plans); Pollman, Startup Governance, supra note 
135, at 36 (“The majority of liquidity events for startups are trade sales 
suggesting that this conflict occurs relatively frequently.”). For concrete 
examples, see Alyson Shontell, The Founder of a $50 Million Startup Just 
Sold His Company—and He Didn’t Make a Dime, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 13, 
2015), www.businessinsider.com/get-satisfaction-founder-says-he-got-
nothing-when-company-was-acquired-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/YE6S-
9Z48]; Christina Farr, Employees at Practice Fusion Expected IPO Riches, 




[https://perma.cc/785B-MCG4]; Dustin Gouker, Documents Reveal FanDuel 
Founders, Most Employees Get $0 In Paddy Power Betfair Deal, LEGAL 
SPORTS REP. (Jul. 3, 2018), www.legalsportsreport.com/21742/fanduel-
founders-common-shareholders-get-nothing-in-ppb-deal/ 
[https://perma.cc/XK96-ZF6Z]. 
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Lack of disclosure obligations of relevant information 
prevents employees from monitoring managerial decisions 
and alleviating conflicts of interest through the credible threat 
of resignation (a threat to “take the University Avenue Walk,” 
if you will206). Employees’ failure to take measures against 
human capital expropriation by founders and directors 
further weaken employees’ trust in the value of start-up 
equity incentives.  
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH RULE 701  
Given the information asymmetry and agency problem 
that characterize the relationships between venture capital-
backed start-ups and their employee equity-holders, as 
summarized in Part IV above, the failing of Rule 701 is not 
merely that it provides employees with either too much or too 
little information—it is both and more. As the lyrics of Johnny 
Mathis and Deniece Williams’s song go, it is “too much, too 
little, too late.” 
A. Too Much  
Recall that when a private issuer crosses the $10 million 
Rule 701 threshold for securities sold in 12 consecutive 
months, it must deliver enhanced disclosure to all the 
recipients involved.207 The enhanced disclosure items include 
information about the risks associated with the investment 
and financial statements furnished in accordance with a 
Regulation A Offering Statement.208 The financial statements 
 
206 In the corporate governance literature, the “Wall Street Walk” 
refers to a shareholder “voting with his feet and selling his shares, rather 
than attempting to be active.” Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall 
Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 2645, 2646 (2009). I suggest that the Silicon Valley equivalent 
idiom should be the University Avenue Walk after Palo Alto’s University 
Avenue, the epicenter of Silicon Valley high tech and start-up culture.  
207 Exemption for Offers and Sales of Securities Pursuant to Certain 
Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts Relating to Compensation, 17 
C.F.R. § 230.701(e) (2018). 
208 See § 230.701(e)(3)–(4). 
4_2019.3_ARAN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2020  4:44 PM 
No. 3:867] MAKING DISCLOSURE WORK 931 
should be dated not more than 180 days before the sale of 
securities executed in reliance on the Rule 701 exemption.209  
Financial statements contain sensitive information that is 
not otherwise available to the public; they provide an in-depth 
look at the company’s growth rate, margins, and financial 
constraints, along with other market-sensitive data.210 The 
disclosure of such information might expose the company’s 
competitive advantage and business strategy.211 Indeed, one 
of the reasons companies delay going public is to guard this 
information for as long as possible.212 The requirement to 
disclose this information to employees (and ex-employees) 
before the company goes public is “too much”: it puts issuers 
at an unnecessary risk of information leakage to 
competitors—especially given that this information has only 
marginal value, if any, to employees, as explained in Section 
III.C.i above. Moreover, the requirement to refresh the 
disclosure documents every 180 days (which practically 
means every quarter) imposes a high financial and 
administrative burden on the issuer and its management.213 
 
209 See § 230.701(e)(4). 
210 See, e.g., Michael Minnis & Nemit Shroff, Why Regulate Private 
Firm Disclosure and Auditing? 47 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 473, 492–93 (2017) 
(reviewing concerns recognized by the academic literature regarding 
disclosure of financial statements and information leakage to potential 
competitors).  
211 See id. at 493. 
212 See, e.g., Michael Schmidt, Why Companies Stay Private, Small 
Business, INVESTOPEDIA (Jun 25, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/08/companies-stay-
private.asp [https://perma.cc/C6DA-JWKA] (citing avoiding public 
disclosure requirements as one of the reasons for companies staying 
private).   
213 Under Rule 701(e) information must be provided as of a date no 
more than 180 days before the date of sale. As a result, for issuers seeking 
to maintain current information, this has the effect of requiring financial 
statements to be available on at least a quarterly basis, and to be completed 
within three months after the end of each quarter, for sales to be permitted 
continuously. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e)(4); see also Concept Release on 
Compensatory Securities Offerings and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 
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The lawyers interviewed for this research described the 
enhanced disclosure requirement as one of the primary pain 
points for large private issuers.214 The American Bar 
Association expressed similar concerns in a letter to the SEC: 
“In our experience, some private issuers intentionally avoid 
crossing the twelve month, $5 million [now $10 million] 
threshold under Rule 701 because they are very concerned 
about the competitive risks of providing financial information, 
especially to former employees.”215 Likewise, the accounting 
firm Ernst and Young (EY) urged its clients to comply with 
Rule 701 disclosures after discovering that “private companies 
. . . may not want or be able to provide financial statements, 
even confidentially, to participants in the offering for 
competitive reasons.”216 
To ease some of the concerns about information leakage, 
the SEC has permitted the use of several safeguards. In 1999, 
when the SEC replaced the Rule’s hard volume ceiling with 
enhanced disclosure requirements, the SEC announced that 
“[p]rivate issuers can use certain mechanisms, such as 
confidentiality agreements, to protect competitive 
 
10521, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,958, 34,963 (July 24, 2018) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 230). 
214 See, e.g., Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting L01: “[Companies] do 
not want employees to walk around with potentially harmful information. 
Even more so, we do not want employees who are about to be laid off walking 
away with this information.”); see also Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting 
L04: “I think companies are typically okay giving almost any sort of 
information except their financials.”). 
215 E-mail from Keith F. Higgins, Chair of the Comm. on Fed. 
Regulation of Sec., American Bar Ass’n, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 20, 2007), 
https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL410000pub/comments/
20070920000000.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQU8-TEPZ]. 
216 ERNST & YOUNG, TECHNICAL LINE FINANCIAL REPORTING 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER SEC RULE 701 FOR PRIVATE COMPANIES THAT ISSUE 
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information.”217 In 2009, the SEC issued a Compliance and 
Disclosure Interpretation (“C&DI”) on Rule 701, clarifying 
that the requirement to deliver the relevant disclosures to 
employees can be satisfied by providing electronic access 
(rather than a hard copy).218 Subsequently, in 2017, the SEC 
issued another C&DI permitting the use of additional safety 
measures, including “standard electronic safeguards, such as 
user-specific login requirements and related measures.”219 
Notably, the SEC approved the use of these measures “either 
alone or in combination with other safeguards, such as the use 
of dedicated physical disclosure rooms” as long as the 
measures taken are not “so burdensome that intended 
recipients cannot effectively access the required 
disclosures.”220 This interpretation clarified some disputes 
regarding the delivery of financial information, but it also 
raised new questions such as whether employees could be 
banned from bringing advisers to a secured data room.221  
 
217 See Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements, 
Securities Act Release No. 7645, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,095, 11,097 (Mar. 8, 1999) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
218 See Securities Act Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Jan. 26, 
2009), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-
interps.htm [https://perma.cc/7272-6FPD] (referencing the Question 
271.15) . 
219 Securities Act Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 6, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-
interps.htm [https://perma.cc/YU9D-USJG] (referencing the Question 
271.25).  
220 Id.; see also Rolfe Winkler, Own Startup Shares? Know Your Rights 
to Company Financials, WALL ST. J.,  (May 24, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/own-startup-shares-know-your-rights-to-
company-financials-1464082203 [https://perma.cc/6A56-2RDZ] (“When 
complying, companies often give employees access to a password-protected 
website with financial information. Option holders are often required to sign 
a nondisclosure agreement first, says Daniel Neuman, an attorney with 
Carney Badley and Spellman.”).  
221 Scott P. Spector & Shawn E. Lampron, SEC’s Latest Guidance 
Clarifies Rule 701 Disclosure Delivery Requirements, FENWICK & WEST LLP 
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/secs-latest-
guidance-clarifies-rule-701-disclosure-delivery-requirements.aspx 
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Since their approval by the SEC, safeguards such as 
nondisclosure agreements, secured data rooms, and personal 
passwords for electronic access have become standard in the 
industry.222 However, even with these measures, it is 
impossible to prevent the unauthorized use of information by 
employees and ex-employees.223 The concern about 
information leakage is so severe that some companies 
allegedly choose to ignore the disclosure requirements. Thus, 
on two occasions, the SEC charged companies for issuing stock 
options without a valid exemption due to the companies’ 
failure to disclose financial statements and risk factors to 
their employees—Google in January 2005 and, more recently, 
Credit Karma, Inc. in March 2018.  
 
[https://perma.cc/6B3F-HBWA] (“[W]e presume a company could prohibit 
an employee from bringing a device with a camera (such as a mobile phone) 
into the physical disclosure room. However, it is unclear whether a service 
provider could be prohibited from bringing a personal adviser into the 
physical disclosure room to assist him or her with understanding the 
disclosure information.”). 
222 Several interviewees commented on this trend, noting that:  
[C]ost is coming down and it makes it easier to administer, 
so you’re seeing more companies go to an online process . . . 
you can access the information online but there are certain 
restrictions put in place. Typically, those sites require a 
password, an additional NDA, there’s a reminder that this 
is confidential information and you’re not allowed to disclose 
it anywhere. Lastly . . . if you try to print it would use some 
kind of watermark and make it difficult to actually see. 
Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting from interviews with L01, L02, L04). 
223 See, e.g., Interviews, supra note 29 (referencing L01 explaining that 
even when the disclosure is delivered in a closed data room, it is impossible 
to prevent leaks); see also Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting L04: “So 
nothing’s full proof. There’s always ways for employees to get around these 
things.”); Pollman, Start-up Governance, supra note 135, at 51 (“Companies 
are in a bind: employees are making investment decisions and are entitled 
to the information, but the company suffers when sensitive financial 
information is leaked. As companies get bigger and stay private longer, 
avoiding leaks becomes harder.”).  
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In 2003, pre-IPO Google faced the enhanced disclosure 
requirements of Rule 701.224 According to the SEC’s 
allegations in a cease and desist order imposed in January 
2005, Google’s General Counsel, David Drummond, believed 
that disclosing financial statements to the company’s 
employees would be “strategically disadvantageous,” as the 
statements’ wide distribution among employees would likely 
result in a leak to competitors.225 Thus, according to the 
allegations, from 2002 to 2004, Google issued more than $80 
million worth of stock options to the company’s employees and 
consultants without registering the offering and without 
providing financial information to the recipients.226 Google 
eventually went public in August 2004.227 Before its IPO, the 
company filed a rescission offer for those options transactions 
after concluding that no exemption was available for the 
offerings.228 In January 2005, Google and Drummond settled 
with the SEC. As part of the settlement, Google and 
 
224 Google, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8523, 2005 WL 82435 (Jan. 
13, 2005), www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8523.htm 
[https://perma.cc/M8JJ-J3U9]. 
225 Id. (“Google viewed the public disclosure of its detailed financial 
information as strategically disadvantageous, as Drummond recognized, 
and the company was concerned that providing option recipients with the 
financial disclosures required by Rule 701 could result in the disclosure of 
this information to the public at large and, significantly, to Google’s 
competitors.”). 
226 Id.  
227 The timing of Google’s IPO was related to the Section 12(g) of the 
Securities Act, which set a 500 held-of-record threshold, before assuming 
reporting obligations. See Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future 
Irrelevancy of Section 12(G), 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529, 1536–37 (discussing 
how companies like Facebook, Google, and Apple were “forced” to go public 
prior to the JOBS Act’s amendment of section 12(g) because they had more 
than 500 shareholders and therefore had to register and become “reporting 
companies”).  
228 Google, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8523, 2005 WL 82435 (Jan. 
13, 2005), www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8523.htm 
[https://perma.cc/M8JJ-J3U9]. 
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Drummond agreed to a cease and desist order for Securities 
Act registration violations.229 
Similarly, according to an SEC’s cease and desist order, 
during late 2014 and 2015, the San Francisco-based fintech 
company Credit Karma issued almost $14 million worth of 
stock options to its employees in 12 consecutive months, 
thereby crossing the threshold that requires enhanced 
disclosure.230 Although senior executives were aware of the 
disclosure requirement, and even though the company had 
already created a virtual data room containing the required 
disclosure items, the company decided not to share the 
information with employees.231 Thus, between August 2015 
and July 2016, the company’s employees paid more than half 
a million dollars to exercise options granted in violation of 
Rule 701.232 Only after the company had received an inquiry 
from the SEC seeking information and documents regarding 
its Rule 701 compliance did the company start to disclose 
detailed financial statements and risk factors to employees. 
Ultimately, the company agreed to pay a $160,000 penalty 
and consented to the SEC’s order without admitting or 
denying the allegations.233  
As these cases demonstrate, companies are fiercely 
protective of their financial information. At the same time, as 
established in Section III.C.3 above, these financial 
disclosures are of very little value to employees. Moreover, 
even if employees knew how to interpret financial statements, 
the value of a start-up company, let alone employees’ 
incentives, would not be reflected in them. According to 
standard accounting principles, the financial statements 
present past recorded transactions, whereas the value of a 
 
229 Id. 
230 Credit Karma, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10469, 2018 WL 
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company derives from its projected future transactions.234 
Likewise, the accountants’ cost principle generally prohibits 
the recording of some of the key assets of a start-up company 
such as trademarks, brand names, and human capital, as an 
asset.235  
The SEC’s enforcement actions therefore seem obscure 
considering that in contrast to the mandatory disclosure of 
financial statements, information that is much more 
important to employees’ interest—including, companies’ 
valuation and exit waterfall—remains under seal, as 
discussed in the following Section.  
B. Too Little  
Imagine that employers would customarily offer 
prospective employees job offers that include their annual 
salary, but with one crucial twist—the offer did not state in 
what currency the salary would be paid.236 Imagine also that 
the prospective employee has no right to require an answer to 
this question, and instead he or she is expected to take a leap 
of faith and trust the employer that the offer is likely in 
dollars.  
This sounds absurd, but this is how the equity 
compensation market currently operates.237 The typical 
 
234 See, e.g., Vijay Govindarajan, Why Financial Statements Don’t Work 




236 Scott Belsky, A Founder-Turned-Venture-Capitalist Reveals How to 
Not Get Trampled by a Unicorn Startup if You’re an Employee with Stock 
Options, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/what-employees-should-know-about-
stock-options-before-they-work-for-startups-2017-1 
[https://perma.cc/MY8P-S8PE] (“To bring this home, it’s like negotiating 
your salary without specifying the currency you’re being paid in.”). 
237 See Jeron Paul, supra note 187 (“[M]ost companies fall under Level 
1. This means that the only information employees have is whatever is 
provided in the legal paperwork for the option grant . . . . While this 
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scenario is that employers offer a number of stock options or 
restricted stock units (“RSUs”) as part of an offer letter, but 
the employers do not mention the total number of shares 
outstanding.238 Without this piece of information, the 
employee cannot know whether the grant represents a 1% 
ownership stake in the company, 0.1%, or any other 
percentage.239 The employee can ask for this information, but 
the employer is not required to provide it. 
Moreover, despite the dramatic influence of preferred 
shareholders’ contractual terms on the value of the common 
stock and employees’ compensation,240 Rule 701 does not 
mandate their disclosure. Most start-up employees do not 
receive any disclosure other than a copy of the compensation 
plan.241 And even the employees who receive enhanced 
disclosure will not find an updated valuation and a list of all 
downside protections and other rights assigned to the 
preferred shares among the disclosure items.242  
 
information is clearly useful and important, it gives the employee virtually 
no information to assess the value of the grant.”). 
238 See id.; see also Atish Davda, 5 Questions You Should Ask Before 
Accepting a Startup Job Offer, INC. (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://www.inc.com/atish-davda/5-questions-you-should-ask-before-
taking-a-start-up-job-offer.html [https://perma.cc/C4MM-Y4FL]. 
239 See Jeron Paul, supra note 187. See also, e.g., Rolfe Winkler, Legal 
Fight Escalates Over Tech Startup’s Financials, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/legal-fight-escalates-over-tech-startups-
financials-1471512602 [https://perma.cc/KS3C-AA7E] (describing a claim 
brought by a start-up employee arguing that the founder has “promised him 
a specific ownership percentage in the company, but after receiving his 
shares, the company declined to tell him what percentage the shares 
represented”). 
240 See supra Section III.C.3.   
241 See Jeron Paul, supra note 187. Companies that issue up to $10 
worth of equity incentives pursuant to Rule 701 exemption in a twelve 
month period must deliver to the recipients only a copy of the compensatory 
benefit plan or the contract. See Asset Backed Securities, 17 C.F.R. § 
229.1113(e) (2019).  
242 Id. Companies that cross the $10 million threshold are required to 
deliver financial statements furnished by Part F/S of Form 1-A—i.e., 
balance sheet, consolidated statements of income (loss), consolidated 
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To understand the financial effect of liquidation 
preferences, participation, veto, and anti-dilution rights on 
the value of their compensation, employees need access to the 
same information that founders and investors rely on when 
making their decisions—a waterfall analysis showing the 
distribution of proceeds in a range of exit scenarios.243  
 
statements of cash flows, and changes in stockholders’ equity. § 229.1113(e). 
According to a recent amendment—interim financial statements also may 
be required to make sure that the date of the most recent financial 
statements is never more than 180 days before the securities are sold or 
issued. See Ran Ben-Tzur et al., Private Companies Need to Update Rule 
701 Financial Statement Disclosures, FENWICK & WEST (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.fenwick.com/publications/Pages/Private-Companies-Need-to-
Update-Rule-701-Financial-Statement-Disclosures.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/PW8H-EPVG]; see also Disclosure Update and 
Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 10532, 83 Fed. Reg. 50,148, 
50,180 n.445 (Oct. 4, 2018). The information provided in the balance sheet 
and description of shareholder equity will allow sophisticated employees to 
learn relevant information, yet not in a manner sufficient to enable accurate 
reconstruction of the capitalization table, downside protections, and the 
distribution waterfall, and consequently, to understand the market value of 
the common stock.  
243 See e.g., Jeron Paul, supra note 187 (“Helping employees 
understand what their shares might be worth in different scenarios involves 
helping them to understand the company’s waterfall.”); Kyle Engelken, 4 
Technology Tools to Make Managing Your Capital Raise Easier, 
WEALTHFORGE (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.wealthforge.com/insights/4-
technology-tools-to-make-managing-your-capital-raise-easier. 
[https://perma.cc/RKQ9-FTFN] (recommending that founders use cap table 
management software because, inter alia, “[o]ne interesting feature of a 
service like this is the exit waterfall analysis that models the allocation of 
value to security holders at varying liquidation values”); see also Heidi 
Roizen, How to Build a Unicorn From Scratch – and Walk Away with 
Nothing, Venture Capital, FORBES (May 18, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/valleyvoices/2015/05/18/how-to-build-a-
unicorn-from-scratch-and-walk-away-with-nothing/#212a5ecb37c4 
[https://perma.cc/5F5Y-P8AA] (“Before you close on any round, you should 
create a waterfall spreadsheet that shows what you and each other 
stakeholder would get in a range of exits – low, medium and high.”); Michael 
Dempsey, Liquidation Preferences, a Waterfall Analysis, and Educating 
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Notably, in other contexts where investors’ payouts are 
based on complicated cash flow distribution arrangements, 
the SEC does require the disclosure of a waterfall analysis. 
For example, with regard to a public offering of asset-backed 
securities, Regulation AB  requires that the registration 
statement address specific factors relating to the asset class, 
including “an appropriate narrative discussion of the 
allocation and priority structure of pool cash flows.”244 This 
description needs to include, inter alia, “the payment 
allocations, rights, and distribution priorities among all 
classes of the issuing entity’s securities.”245 In addition, the 
issuer is required to “present the flow of funds graphically if 
doing so will aid understanding.”246  
The vast majority of companies are reluctant to disclose 
valuation information and exit waterfalls.247 However, the 
secrecy around the capitalization table and contractual terms 
of preferred investors is dubious given that this information is 
included in the certificate of incorporation each company is 
required to file in its state of incorporation (because the vast 
majority of venture capital-backed companies are 
incorporated in Delaware, these documents are publicly 
available via the Delaware Division of Corporations).248 In 
 
(providing waterfall analysis spreadsheet for the benefit of “both employees 
and founders to better understand how they can be affected by things such 
as stacked liquidation preferences over the course of their company’s 
financing history”); Inna J Efimchik, Waterfall Analysis (How VCs See the 
World), AVVO (May 2, 2012), https://www.avvo.com/legal-
guides/ugc/waterfall-analysis-how-vcs-see-the-world 
[https://perma.cc/5C63-8TSL] (“In evaluating an investment, investors will 
usually run what is known as a waterfall analysis.”). 
244 17 C.F.R. § 229.1113(a). 
245 Asset-Backed Securities, 70 Fed. Reg. 1506, 1546 (Jan. 7, 2005) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228–30, 232, 239–40, 242, 249). 
246 17 C.F.R. § 229.1113(a)(2); see also Asset-Backed Securities, 70 Fed. 
Reg. at 1546 (“A clear description of the flow of funds for the transaction is 
required.”). 
247 See e.g., Jeron Paul, supra note 187. 
248 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 242 (2019); see also Gornall & Strebulaev, supra 
note 135, at 24–25 (describing retrieving unicorns’ capitalization table data 
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most cases, interested third parties can retrieve the 
company’s certificate of incorporation and reverse engineer 
the capitalization table and exit waterfall.  
The reasons this study’s interviewees gave for not sharing 
capitalization table and liquidation preference information 
with employees included awkwardness of the conversation,249 
fear of securities law liability,250 fear of placing a limitation on 
managerial discretion in the operation of the business,251 and 
fear of demoralization among employees if they knew the 
truth about the company.252 Some founders interviewed for 
this research mentioned the need to “sell the dream” to their 
employees, just as they do with their investors.253  
However, from a regulatory standpoint, these arguments 
cannot stand. As further described in Part VI below, replacing 
 
via publicly available certificates of incorporation); Interviews, supra note 
29 (referencing L02 noting that a sophisticated party can obtain the 
company documents from Delaware and reverse engineer the capitalization 
table and exit waterfall. Although theoretically, a company can also 
completely hide this information and not include it in its incorporation 
documents). 
249 See Interviews, supra note 29 (citing VC02 explaining that “it is 
easier to avoid these issues and there is no obligation to do otherwise”). 
250 It is easier not to disclose information in the first place, than to 
make sure that is it accurate and not misleading. See e.g., Interviews, supra 
note 29 (quoting F06: “The employer does not want to disclose information 
because he does not want to be liable to the employee . . . . Given that I do 
not want to personally advise the employee, I can pay an attorney for that, 
but why would I want to bear the costs?! It’s a headache . . . .”); see also 
Jeron Paul, supra note 187.  
251 See e.g., Interviews, supra note 29 (citing F09 explaining that 
“confidentiality serves as a tool in the managerial toolbox”).  
252 See e.g., id. (referencing F04 describing his main challenge as an 
entrepreneur as “keeping employees’ morale high despite whatever 
difficulties that the company is experiencing” and using the following 
analogy: “It’s like being a marine commander leading his troops to the 
battlefield; if I’ll tell them the truth, which is, we’re all going to die, they 
will run away”). 
253 Id.; see also id. (citing F03 predicting that total transparency to 
employees “would kill the venture capital industry,” and explaining that 
“founder sell a dream to their employees just as they do with their 
investors”). 
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the requirement to disclose financial statements with a 
requirement to disclose valuation information and waterfall 
analysis would better serve the interests of both parties. It 
will provide employees with an ongoing and realistic valuation 
of the return on their labor investments while protecting the 
confidentiality of start-ups’ market-sensitive data.     
C. Too Late  
One of the most curious aspects of the current disclosure 
regime is the timing for the delivery requirement. Under Rule 
701(e)(6), the timing of the disclosure varies by the security 
granted: if the employee receives stock options, the disclosure 
must be delivered within “a reasonable period of time before 
the date of exercise.”254 If, on the other hand, the employee 
receives RSUs, a kind of equity-based security that, unlike 
stock options, does not involve an exercise decision by the 
employee,255 the disclosure must be delivered before the RSU 
award is granted.256 The result is somewhat paradoxical: 
 
254 Exemption for Offers and Sales of Securities Pursuant to Certain 
Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts Relating to Compensation, 17 
C.F.R. § 230.701(e)(6) (2018). In practice, lawyers from the leading firms in 
Silicon Valley advise their clients to deliver the disclosure before the 
employee’s grant starts vesting—typically, before the employee celebrates 
first work anniversary and reaches the one-year cliff of the vesting schedule. 
See Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting LO4: “There’s another bit of 
disagreement in terms of when that [reasonable time] takes place. I 
typically advise clients ‘let’s go back to that one-year cliff . . . you really want 
to provide a reasonable period of time before that . . . .”). 
255 A detailed discussion on the mechanics of RSUs is beyond the scope 
of this Article. For more on the differences between stock options and RSUs 
and how the latter evolved in Silicon Valley, see Andy Rachleff, How Do 
Stock Options and RSUs Differ?, WEALTHFRONT (Feb. 6, 2014), 
https://blog.wealthfront.com/stock-options-versus-rsu/ 
[https://perma.cc/NY2N-DZ3Q]. 
256 See Securities Act Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 
19, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-
interps.htm [https://perma.cc/THW2-WM68] (quoting the answer to 
Question 271.24: “For the sale of an RSU award that relies on Rule 701 for 
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employees being paid with low-risk securities (RSUs) receive 
information more promptly than do employees who receive 
high-risk securities (stock options).257 Either way, the 
information reaches employees only after they have made the 
most crucial decision as to whether to accept an offer that 
includes an equity component.  
Such late disclosure is problematic on both legal and 
economic grounds. On the legal side, as noted above in Section 
II.A, grants that are offered to prospective employees as an 
inducement to accept employment generally constitute a 
“sale” of securities.258 It follows that disclosure should be given 
before the prospective employee makes an investment 
decision and the “sale” takes place.259 In other words, the 
disclosure should be given before the employee accepts a 
compensation arrangement that includes an investment 
component. On the economic side, late disclosure is inefficient 
and wasteful because it fails to guide the decisions of 
employee-investors. As discussed in Section IV.A, human 
capital is a scarce resource whose allocation is responsive to 
equity incentives. To facilitate the efficient allocation of this 
 
exemption, the date of sale is the date it is granted. As such, the issuer must 
provide the required information a reasonable time before the date the RSU 
award is granted.”). 
257 On the differences between private companies’ RSUs and stock 
options, see generally Jeron Paul, RSUs vs. Options: Why RSUs (Restricted 
Stock Units) Could be Better Than Stock Options at Your Private Company, 
CAPSHARE BLOG (Jul. 9, 2016), www.capshare.com/blog/rsus-vs-options/ 
[https://perma.cc/4YFJ-PHBW] (citing Bill Gates: “The fact is that the 
variation in the value of an option is just too great . . . . And so as soon as 
they saw that options could go both ways, we proposed an economic 
equivalent.”); see also Should You Ask for RSUs or Stock Options? FLOW FIN. 
PLANNING (Aug. 7, 2018), https://flowfp.com/rsus-vs-stock-options/ 
[https://perma.cc/W3YC-QL7S] (indicating “[a]n RSU is always worth 
something, unless the company goes bankrupt. An option is worth 
something only if the market price of the stock is above the strike price of 
your option . . . . You don’t have to make a choice. They just ‘happen’ as long 
as you stick around . . . .”). 
258 See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.   
259 Recall that according to Ralston Purina Co., employees’ access to 
information is prerequisite to their participation in a private offering. See 
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953). 
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resource, employees need to receive information before they 
commit to an employment opportunity. Without timely 
disclosure, information asymmetry between entrepreneurs 
and employees might diminish employees’ trust and erode the 
sustainability of the equity compensation market as discussed 
in Section IV.B above.  
As described in greater detail in SectionVI.B.2 below, to 
allow information to serve its purpose, the timing of the 
disclosure requirement under Rule 701 should be amended: 
employers should disclose their valuation and waterfall exit 
information to prospective employees prior to employees’ 
acceptance of the job offer. Assuming that the prospective 
employee has accepted the offer, an ongoing disclosure 
obligation is needed to allow employees to continue 
monitoring the return on their labor investments and mitigate 
agency costs. 
V. REWRITING RULE 701  
The following Part sketches a proposal for a fundamental 
reworking of the disclosure regime governing the relationship 
between start-ups and their equity-compensated employees. 
It starts by reviewing two predominant proposals put 
forward—representing a maximalist approach and a 
minimalist one to the regulation of disclosures to start-up 
employees. Based on the advantages and disadvantages of 
these proposals, the Article then calls for the implementation 
of an intermediate approach, which differs from previous 
proposals in important ways, including the content, timing, 
and the threshold to trigger enhanced disclosure obligations 
under Rule 701.  
A. Existing Proposals    
Other authors have debated the need for reform in the 
regulation of equity-based compensation.260 The following 
Sections briefly describe these proposals. 
 
260 See., e.g., Cable, supra note 5, at 639–41; Alon-Beck, supra note 145, 
at 175–90. 
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1. The Maximalist Approach 
The most elaborate amendment proposal to the mandatory 
disclosure obligation was offered by Alon-Beck. This proposal 
is maximalist in the sense that it advocates adding further 
disclosure items on top of the existing ones. Alon-Beck 
recommends that in addition to the current requirement to 
deliver a copy of the compensatory benefit plan, or the 
contract, to Rule 701 offerees, unicorn companies would be 
required to disclose the following items:  
(1) Information on the composition and compensation 
of the management team;  
(2) any super-voting rights that were granted to the 
founders;  
(3) current and future stock and debt issuances 
(including debt evidenced by convertible notes or simple 
agreements for future equity, known as “safes”);  
(4) a list of investors holding more than a specified 
percentage (perhaps 1%) of the outstanding stock (including 
their liquidation preferences and conversion rights); and  
(5) quarterly estimated fair market value of the 
stock.261 
In addition, Alon-Beck calls for mandating that the 
employer provide employees with the assistance of an 
experienced and independent purchaser representative,262 
and to subject unicorn companies to independent auditing of 
their financial statements.263   
Alon-Beck’s proposal essentially calls for the adoption of 
every measure that could address employees’ informational 
disadvantage and lack of investment proficiency. The proposal 
addresses the main challenges discussed in Part IV of this 
Article, including employees’ lack of sophistication (by 
requiring companies to hire an independent purchaser 
representative for their employees), the complicated capital 
structure that creates disparities in value of preferred and 
 
261 Alon-Beck, supra note 147, at 183–85.  
262 Id. at 185. 
263 Id. 
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common stock (by requiring the disclosure of all downside 
protections and debt arrangements), and the inability of the 
corporate governance framework to curb the agency problem 
that arises between employees and founders (by calling for the 
disclosure of management incentives and voting rights).   
However, this proposal comes at the price of a substantive 
regulatory burden for start-ups, including the costs of hiring 
a purchaser representative to act on behalf of its employees, 
an auditing firm to perform an audit of its financial 
statements, and the cost of issuing quarterly estimates of the 
fair market value of its stock. This proposal also raises privacy 
concerns with regard to the sensitive information of the issuer 
and its investors. The proposal does not address start-ups’ 
legitimate concern about information leakage to potential 
competitors who can use it to negate the start-up’s advantage. 
It is therefore unsurprising that an entirely opposite approach 
is advanced by attorneys representing the issuers.      
2. The Minimalist Approach  
If Alon-Beck’s proposal is maximalist in the sense of 
requiring the disclosure of every piece of information that 
could be relevant to the investment decision of employees, the 
attorneys lobbying for the industry-side are advancing a 
minimalist approach in the sense of revealing as little as 
possible. Thus, in response to the SEC’s call for proposals 
regarding ways to modernize Rule 701,264 start-up attorneys 
have requested the regulator to do away with the disclosure of 
financial statements and replace it with a modest disclosure 
of the fair market value of the common stock. For example, 
the law firm Sullivan & Cromwell LLP has submitted a 
proposal to permit companies to provide Internal Revenue 
Code Section 409A valuation information regarding its 
securities in lieu of financial statements.265  
 
264 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
265 Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-
18/s71818-4418282-175673.pdf. [https://perma.cc/F5XC-8UK5].    
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To understand the logic of this proposal, a few words on 
409A valuations are necessary. Under Section 409A of the 
Internal Revenue Code, every private issuer that issues stock 
options to its employees is required to establish the fair 
market value of its common stock on the day of the grant.266 
This value then determines the exercise price of the stock 
options.267 The valuation of the fair market value of the 
common stock is often referred to in the industry as a “409A 
valuation.”268 Start-ups can obtain these appraisals on their 
own,269 however, if they rely on an independent third party to 
appraise the value of the company’s equity, they enjoy a “safe 
harbor” protection should the IRS get involved (i.e., the 
burden of proof would be on the IRS to show that the valuation 
is too low).270 The safe harbor under the tax code has led to the 
creation of a cottage industry to conduct these appraisals.271  
 
266  IRS Revenue Ruling 59-60 defines fair market value as “the price 
at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller when the former is not under any compulsion to buy and the 
latter is not under any compulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable 
knowledge of relevant facts.” See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. 
267 Section 422 of the Code sets minimum exercise price with respect to 
Incentive Stock Options. Nonqualified Stock Options could be granted with 
an exercise price per share of less than the Fair Market Value of the 
Common Stock on the Grant Date if the Option either: (a) is not “deferred 
compensation” within the meaning of Section 409A; or (b) meets all the 
requirements for Awards that are considered “deferred compensation” 
within the meaning of Section 409A. See DAVID ALTMAN, 10 BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 133.04 (2019); see also Victor 
Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26 VA. 
TAX REV. 1031, 1043 (2007). Stock options are considered “nonqualified 
deferred compensation.” The grant of restricted stock and RSUs does not 
require a 409A valuation because these securities do have a strike price.  
268 See ALTMAN, supra note 267, at § 133.04. 
269 Id.  
270 Id.  
271 See, e.g., 409A as a Service: Cash Cows Get Slaughtered, SILICON 
HILLS LAWYER (Mar. 15, 2014), 
https://siliconhillslawyer.com/2014/03/15/409a-service-cash-cows-get-
slaughtered/. [https://perma.cc/WMV3-ALGD] (“While well-intentioned, it 
spawned a cottage industry of third-party valuation firms.”).  
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Private issuers are required to update their 409A 
valuations every twelve months and anytime their value 
materially changes—for example, following a new funding 
round.272 The appropriate valuation methodology varies 
according to the company’s stage of development,273 but it 
almost always requires in one form or another the 
performance of a waterfall analysis. 274 This analysis assumes 
that the company’s equity is sold and the proceeds are 
allocated in a “waterfall” down the different equity classes of 
shares, according to their respective liquidation preferences, 
until the common stockholders finally receive the residual 
claim, if any exists.275 The waterfall analysis itself would be 
 
272 Commenting on this requirement, Altman notes that: 
[T]he use of a value previously calculated under a valuation 
method is not reasonable as of a later date if the calculation 
fails to reflect information available after the date of the 
calculation that may materially affect the value of the 
corporation . . . . Furthermore, the value cannot have been 
calculated for a date that is more than 12 months earlier 
than the date for which the valuation is being used. 
ALTMAN, supra note 267, at § 133.04(7). The consequences of not obtaining 
a 409A valuation and pricing the strike price of stock option grants in a less 
formal manner could cause significant tax penalties. Any option holders 
discovered to violate 409A will have to pay taxes plus a 20% federal penalty, 
any applicable state penalties, an IRS tax underpayment penalty, and any 
interest on unpaid taxes. 
273 See Valuation Allocation Methods, VERISTRAT (Sept. 8, 2015), 
https://www.veristrat.com/blog-valuation/valuation-allocation-methods/ 
[https://perma.cc/RC6Q-7RLX]; see also Nate Nead, 409A Valuations 
Methods, INV. BANK, https://investmentbank.com/409a-valuation-methods/ 
[https://perma.cc/2U3D-6U3V]. 
274 See Valuation Allocation Methods, supra note 273; see also Henry 
Ward, Transparent 409A, CARTA BLOG (May 3, 2016), 
https://carta.com/blog/transparent-409a/ [https://perma.cc/F7XS-WGY9] 
(“A proper 409A creates a waterfall on the capital structure of the company. 
The waterfall is the most important piece of a valuation because it captures 
the embedded liquidation preferences.”)  
275 See id.  
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used to generate the final 409A valuation, but typically would 
not be included in the final report.276  
Currently, the “409A valuation” is meant to serve the 
reporting obligation of companies towards the relevant tax 
authorities, not towards its employees.277 Companies typically 
try to keep their “409A valuation” as low as possible because 
a low “409A valuation” allows for setting a low strike price for 
employees’ stock options.278 The lower the strike price is, the 
more useful employee stock options are for recruitment and 
retention purposes.279 It is, therefore, a well-known secret that 
these valuations are highly inaccurate and can be negotiated 
 
276 Id. (“This is hidden in most reports.”).  
277 See William D. Cohan, Valuation Shell Game: Silicon Valley’s Dirty 
Secret, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/business/dealbook/valuation-shell-
game-silicon-valleys-dirty-secret.html [https://perma.cc/SR5G-5F2Y] (“You 
want to know the dirty little secret of Silicon Valley? It’s called the 409A 
valuation.”). 
278 For a classic but outdated treatment of the issue, see Gilson & 
Schizer, supra note 172, at 898 (“The key to a reduced tax bill, then, is to 
value the common stock based on a hypothetical immediate liquidation in 
which preferred stockholders claim almost everything.”). See also Founders 
Circle, 10 Things to Know About 409A Valuation: Dispersion of Employee 
Wealth: 409A Valuation, MEDIUM (Aug. 3, 2017) 
https://medium.com/kitchen-table-series/everything-you-need-to-know-
about-409a-valuation-dispersion-of-employee-wealth-e4adf647f4d5. 
[https://perma.cc/FX5B-ZBXV] (“Management typically wants to grant as 
many shares as possible at the lowest price as possible to incentivize for 
long-term wealth creation.”); Jeron Paul, 409A Valuations vs Venture 
Valuations, CAPSHARE BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://www.capshare.com/blog/409a-valuations-vs-venture-valuations/ 
[https://perma.cc/8UPQ-39YJ] (“409A valuation firms pick a point estimate 
that is toward the low end of a defensible range of values. They do this 
because their clients want the valuation to be as low as possible. Clients 
want a low 409A valuation. This allows them to grant stock options to their 
employees at a low price.”); Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 135, at 9 
(“Many companies push their 409A providers for lower valuations as this 
allows them greater freedom in setting option strike prices.”). 
279 See Founders Circle, supra note 278.   
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down by the company.280 Because the appraisal firm wishes to 
maintain a long-lasting business relationship with the 
company, and given that the valuation is based on information 
provided by the management team and is subject to board 
approval, the employer maintains nearly full control over the 
result.281  
Nevertheless, start-ups’ control over their 409A valuation 
tends to weaken as the company matures. That is because, in 
a mature company, significant cash flows could be equated to 
comparable public companies to generate valuation multiples 
that are used to calculate the fair market value. Moreover, 
employees of mature start-ups typically start trading their 
securities on secondary markets thereby generating market 
price indications.  Besides, as the company matures, it is likely 
to shift to granting RSUs to its employees instead of relying 
on stock options. Such a shift eliminates the motivation to 
lower the 409A valuation to keep the exercise price attractive 
to employees.282 
As Sullivan & Cromwell’s proposal correctly points out, 
409A valuations are more relevant to employees’ needs.283 
However, two caveats are in order: these valuations only have 
 
280 See Cohan, supra note 277; see also Interviews, supra note 29 
(referencing L02 expressing somewhat cynical view of the industry: “before 
409A, we used to deal with common stock valuation in the following way: 
the common stock was generally valued at 10% of the preferred, and as we 
got closer to an IPO, the 10% gap shrunk. Today there is an entire cottage 
industry around 409A valuations, but the result is similar”); Interviews, 
supra note 29 (quoting F07: “[I]t’s just a farce for the IRS.”); Interviews, 
supra note 29 (quoting F03: “409A valuations are irrelevant.”). 
281 See Interviews, supra note 29 (citing F07 describing negotiations 
with 409A appraisal firms regarding the final result).  
282 Founders Circle, supra note 278 (“[W]hen the company matures] 
[y]ou can rely more on the company’s financial forecast, and public comps 
become a more reliable benchmark.”); see also Cohan, supra note 277 
(“Obviously this becomes a problem when an employee wants to sell his or 
her private stock . . . . This is often the point where the founder steps in and 
says, sorry, no sale, or at least not at the higher valuation.”). 
283 Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 265, at 9 (“In our experience, 
valuation information is more useful for an employee to evaluate his or her 
equity award grant than early-stage financial information.”). 
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informational value for relatively mature start-ups, and only  
when accompanied by the waterfall analysis that was used to 
generate the final outcome. The disclosure of the 409A 
valuation, in and of itself, cannot satisfy employees’ need for 
information because it presents an estimate of the value of the 
common stock at a specific point in time. The disclosure of the 
valuation alone will not reveal the effect of the preferred 
shareholders’ right on the value of the common stock in 
various exit scenarios down the road.  
The minimalist approach offered by Sullivan & Cromwell 
thus has clear benefits. Obviously, a company cannot have two 
different valuations; one to satisfy disclosure obligations 
towards employees, and another to comply with tax laws.284 
Therefore, any reworking of the disclosure obligation towards 
employees needs to consider possible tax implications and 
must try to avoid adverse consequences, such as sabotaging 
companies’ ability to rely on stock options for recruitment 
purposes. Moreover, two auditing systems are impractical as 
they double compliance costs and managerial distraction. 
Still, 409A valuations without an accompanying exit waterfall 
analysis leave the most important information for employees’ 
needs out.     
Thus far, we have explored two possible approaches – the 
maximalist approach, offered by Alon-Beck, and the 
minimalist approach, advanced, inter alios, by Sullivan & 
Cromwell LLP. Both approaches have advantages and 
disadvantages, and offer meaningful insights moving forward. 
Specifically, Alon-Beck’s proposal addresses the need to tailor 
the disclosure items to the capital structure of venture-backed 
companies and tackle the agency problems that arise between 
employees and management (via disclosure of management 
incentives, and the use of purchaser representatives). On the 
other hand, Sullivan & Cromwell’s proposal brings to front 
pragmatic considerations, including the futility of the 
requirement to disclose financial statements, and the need to 
unify companies’ disclosure obligations towards tax 
authorities and employees. 
 
284 See, e.g., Gilson & Schizer, supra note 172, at 898.  
4_2019.3_ARAN (DO NOT DELTE) 1/8/2020  4:44 PM 
952 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
The following Section offers a middle ground between the 
maximalist and minimalist approaches, which integrates 
practical considerations and ensures the timely and full 
disclosure to employees.        
B. An Intermediate Approach to Disclosure  
Pragmatism and comprehensive disclosures are often 
portrayed as competing objectives that regulators are rarely 
able to satisfy at the same time. However, in the context of 
private issuers’ disclosure to equity-compensated employees, 
it is possible to move forward on both fronts. The following 
Sections lay out the proposed amendments in the content, 
timing, and threshold to trigger an enhanced disclosure 
obligation towards start-up employees.       
1. Content of the Disclosure  
As argued in Section III.C.1, the starting point for drafting 
the disclosure requirement to start-up employees should be 
the recognition that, unlike in other disclosure contexts, the 
primary recipient of the disclosure here is an unsophisticated 
investor.285 Moreover, start-up employees do not participate in 
an active efficient market in which information is quickly 
absorbed in the stock’s price.286 Therefore, to create a 
disclosure framework that could serve this particular class of 
investors, there is a need to depart from standard disclosure 
forms that are designed to accommodate the needs of public 
market investors. In other words, employees’ lack of financial 
proficiency should guide not only the existence of a disclosure 
requirement but also the form of the disclosure. If disclosure 
to employees is packed with irrelevant information and is 
cluttered with financial and legal terms that a layperson does 
not understand, such disclosure would frustrate, not satisfy, 
 
285 See supra Section III.C.1. 
286 See supra Section III.C.3. 
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the goal of allowing employees to form intelligent investment 
decisions.287 
The fact that the financial structure of start-ups is often 
multilayered and complicated, as described in Section III.C.2, 
does not necessarily dictate that disclosure to employees 
should be complicated as well. Delivering all the information 
that the maximalist approach requires, including quarterly 
fair market value estimates and a full description of a 
company’s ownership structure, downside protections, and 
super-voting rights might be overwhelming to employees who, 
as established in Section III.C.1, on the whole, do not know 
how to account for the economic meaning of this information. 
However, most of the information that the maximalist 
approach calls to disclose, including details as to downside 
protections, management incentive programs, and the fair 
market value of the common stock, could be delivered in a 
more digestible, aggregate form in combining a 409A 
valuation and exit waterfall analysis through data 
visualization (graphical representation). 
Over the years, multiple capitalization table software 
programs have evolved to help companies document, manage, 
and simulate capitalization table data and employee incentive 
programs, as well as to visualize the distribution of proceeds 
among the various equity holders in different exit scenarios.288 
 
287 See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU 
WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 101–106 (2014) 
(explaining that quantity and complexity reduce the effectiveness of 
disclosures due to the information overload problem by reviewing relevant 
empirical evidence); see also OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 36 (2012) (“For 
imperfectly rational consumers, information overload is an even bigger 
problem.”); Alexandra Galkin, How to Share Company Financials With Your 
Employees, INC. MAG. (Aug. 1, 2011), 
https://www.inc.com/guides/201108/what-company-finances-to-share-with-
employees.html [https://perma.cc/58MS-U7W9] (advising not to give raw 
financials because employees do not understand them, and recommending 
instead to “present information in digest or summary format”).  
288 According to a 2019 report by Orbis Research on the cap table 
management software market, the key players in this domain include: 
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One of the crucial functions that some of these programs 
automate is the exit waterfall analysis—i.e., the distribution 
of proceeds to the different classes of shareholders based on 
the capitalization table data accounting for liquidation 
preferences and other preferred rights, conversion scenarios, 
and the seniority of different share classes.289 
An exit waterfall analysis provides the payout to every 
class of shares (or individual equity holder/optionee) under 
any given exit scenario. Thus, for each “exit valuation” x-
value, the analysis would produce a y-value of an 
individualized “payout.” These values can then be presented 
in graphical form, in which the y-axis represents the payouts, 
and the x-axis represents the exit value—also known as a 
“breakpoint report.” The advantage of this report for 
disclosure purposes is that it provides individualized bottom-
line information in a clear form, regardless of employees’ lack 
of understanding of the legal and algebraic meaning of 
provisions such as liquidation preferences, participation 
rights, caps to participation, dividends, ratchets, and so on.290  
A middle ground between the minimalist and the 
maximalist approaches could thereby be reached by replacing 
the disclosure of financial statements, which from employees’ 
perspective, contain irrelevant and incomprehensible 
information,291 with the disclosure of a company’s 409A 
valuation accompanied by a graphical exit waterfall report 
 
Carta, Certent, Solium, Imagineer Technology Group, Capdesk, 
Computershare, Koger, Altvia Solutions, Preqin Solutions, Gust, Global 
Shares, TruEquity, Eqvista, and Euronext. See Husain, Global Equity 
Management Software Market Insights 2019: Industry Overview, 





289 See, e.g., Plan For The Future With Scenario Modeling, CARTA, 
https://carta.com/scenario-modeling/ [https://perma.cc/Y8UM-QFKZ]; see 
also Engelken, supra note 243.   
290 See supra Section III.C.2. 
291 See supra Section III.A. 
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that reveals the payout to the specific employee under various 
exit scenarios. Such a shift would allow parties to meet 
halfway: employers would get to keep the confidentiality of 
their financial statements, and would only be subjected to an 
existing regulatory scheme with a minor modification (the 
disclosure of an exit waterfall report that includes a graphical 
representation of the range of possible payouts to employees). 
At the same time, employees would receive access to the 
information that is relevant to their valuation challenge,292 
including all material information regarding the capital 
structure of the company and its anticipated impact on 
employee payout based on various exit valuations.   
The proposed reform significantly reduces the burden on 
issuers by replacing the disclosure of financial statements 
with a much more modest form of disclosure—valuation 
information and exit waterfall analysis. Considering the 
amount of information included in this demand and the non-
proprietary nature of the information,293 it would be 
reasonable to require companies to provide this information 
to prospective employees before they make an investment 
decision. Thus, this Article calls for the disclosure obligation 
to precede the commencement of the employment relationship 
by incorporating the relevant information in the offer letter—
as explained in the following Section.  
2. Timing of the Disclosure 
The relationship between start-ups and their employee-
equity-holders involves more than a single investment 
decision. The first decision facing the employee is whether to 
accept a job offer that includes an equity compensation 
component, reject the offer, or negotiate the levels of cash and 
equity in the compensation agreement.294 The second decision 
is an ongoing one—the decision to continue working for the 
firm in an effort to satisfy the vesting schedule. Once the 
 
292 See supra Section III.C.3. 
293 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.  
294 See supra Section II.A. 
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equity grant is vested, employees who earn stock options 
(rather than restricted stock or RSUs) need to decide whether 
to exercise the options and purchase the shares. Finally, as 
shareholders, employees face the dilemma of when and how to 
sell their equity—that is, to “cash-out” in whole or in part.295  
To make these decisions in an informed manner, 
employees need information. First, in order to help guide 
employees’ decision of whether to enter into an employment 
relationship, the disclosure should be delivered with the offer 
letter. Such disclosure will allow prospective employees to 
compare different job offers and separate between low-quality 
and high-quality equity grants. An ex-ante disclosure regime 
is needed in order to resolve the market inefficiencies caused 
by information asymmetry, including suboptimal matches 
between companies and employees,296 and the downward 
spiral of price and quality (the lemons market problem).297     
An ex-ante disclosure regime might strike some readers as 
excessive. After all, at the offer letter stage, there is no 
guarantee that the candidate will accept the offer, and so the 
company might end up disclosing information to candidates 
 
295 Cf. Cable, supra note 5, at 615 (describing three investment 
decisions that are involved in equity compensation: “(1) accepting the option 
initially in exchange for valuable human capital, (2) continuing at the 
company as its business developed, and (3) exercising the option (typically 
through a cash payment equal to the exercise price) as the stated expiration 
date approached.”). As for the fourth decision – of whether and when to sell 
the shares—traditionally, the opportunity to consider this only became 
relevant after the company’s IPO, by which time, the company was already 
subject to public disclosure obligations and its share price had already been 
determined by an active market. However, today, companies stay private 
for longer durations, and secondary sales of employee securities via online 
private markets or company-sponsored programs become significant 
liquidity opportunity for employees. As such, for many employees, the 
decision whether to sell their shares becomes relevant before the company 
goes public. See Aran, supra note 4, at 1290; see also Pollman, supra note 
158, at 195–202 (describing the evolution of online marketplaces for private 
companies’ stock, and detailing the trading volumes and the information 
available on two such marketplaces).  
296 See supra Section IV.A.  
297 See supra Section IV.B.  
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whom it will not ultimately hire. However, the same problem 
arises with the disclosure of information to potential capital 
investors. In addition, this problem can be addressed by non-
disclosure agreements.298   
After the initial disclosure, if the candidate accepts the 
offer, the following disclosures should be delivered every 
twelve months and following any material event that may 
change the valuation of the company. For practical reasons, 
and to avoid imposing additional administrative burdens on 
the issuer, the recommended conditions are similar to those 
set forth in Section 409A to the Internal Revenue Code. 299 The 
definition of “material event” shall include, for example, a new 
funding round, resolution of material litigation, issuance of a 
patent, failure to meet a significant milestone, major change 
to the capitalization table, or board approval of a management 
incentive plan that could reasonably be expected to affect the 
value of the common stock.300     
By unifying rules concerning the timing of appraisals and 
disclosures across tax regulation (Section 409A) and securities 
regulation (Rule 701), it is possible to lower the regulatory 
burden on issuers and deliver up-to-date information to 
employees. The following Section offers a new threshold to 
trigger the enhanced disclosure requirement.  
 
298 For a critical discussion of pre-investment non-disclosure 
agreements see e.g., Chris Coulter, Should You Require a Signed NDA From 
a Potential VC Investor?, COOLEYGO, https://www.cooleygo.com/should-you-
require-a-signed-nda-from-a-potential-investor/ [https://perma.cc/6JZ2-
2E43]; see also Padraig Walsh, When You Should (But Mainly Shouldn’t) 




299 See 26 U.S.C. § 409A (2012). 
300 See ALTMAN, supra note 267, at § 133.04(7) (explaining that an 
update to a 409A valuation is required when “the [previous] calculation fails 
to reflect information available after the date of the calculation that may 
materially affect the value of the corporation . . . . Furthermore, the value 
cannot have been calculated for a date that is more than 12 months earlier 
than the date for which the valuation is being used.”). 
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3. Enhanced Disclosure Threshold  
Under the current disclosure regime, issuers become 
subject to the enhanced disclosure requirement only when 
they issue more than $10 million worth of securities during a 
twelve-month period.301 The $10 million threshold effectively 
limits the enhanced disclosure obligation to very large, pre-
IPO issuers,302 which means that disclosure is the exception 
rather than the rule for start-ups.303  
The maximalist approach offered by Alon-Beck calls to 
subject all unicorn companies to enhanced disclosure 
requirements.304 However, as discussed in Section III.C.3 
above, private market valuations are somewhat arbitrary and 
are responsive to the risk allocation between preferred 
stockholders and common stockholders.305 Therefore, instead 
of focusing on the valuation, the intermediate approach calls 
to adopt a two-pronged  test to trigger the enhanced disclosure 
requirement where: (1) the company has issued equity 
incentives in Rule 701 offerings to 100 employees or more; and 
(2) the aggregate ownership percentage of these employees on 
a fully diluted basis is more than 10% of a class of the 
company’s equity securities.  
The 100-employee threshold is pragmatic and reasonable 
because employers of that magnitude are already expected to 
have human resources and legal departments in place. In 
addition, in such large organizations employees’ ability to 
access financial information and monitor managerial 
decisions declines, therefore the need for disclosure 
 
301 See supra Section II.C. 
302 See Interviews, supra note 29 (quoting L04: “[M]ost companies that 
are bumping into this $5 million limit are bigger companies. In fact, they’re 
usually on the verge of a liquidity event.”).  
303 See Alon-Beck, supra note 145, at 182 (noting that “[t]he Economic 
Growth Act . . . leaves employees holding potentially tens of millions of 
dollars of illiquid stock at the mercy of the majority, without access to 
detailed financial statements and adequate disclosures of risks and 
prospects to help guide their investment decisions”). 
304 See supra Section VI.A.1. 
305 See supra Section III.C.3. 
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increases.306 Some commentators view the 100-employee 
threshold as a stage at which the company ceases to be a start-
up.307 More importantly, start-ups that issue equity incentives 
to more than 100 employees would find it difficult not to use 
capitalization table management software (which is often 
requested by investors as part of a due diligence process)308 
and to avoid hiring an external valuation firm to provide their 
409A valuation. Therefore, the disclosure requirement would 
not impose a significant cost on start-ups by forcing them to 
pay for additional services. The 100-employee threshold is 
also consonant with the general notion of employment law, 
whereby employers of 100 employees are considered large 
enough to conform with certain regulatory requirements. 
Moreover, companies with over 100 employees have 
generally advanced their business beyond the seed and Series 
A financing round stages.309 As the start-up transitions from 
its early-stage to a phase of rapid growth and scaling, it will 
typically turn to raise additional rounds of funding, which will 
likely increase the complexity of its capital structure and the 
 
306 See Cable, supra note 5, at 631 (expressing the view that employees 
of early-stage startups are well positioned to gain inside knowledge and 
monitor management).   
307 See, e.g., Tom Ireland, Welcome to the Big Leagues: At What Point 
Are You No Longer A Startup? BUSINESS.COM (Dec. 14, 2015), 
https://www.business.com/articles/at-what-point-are-you-no-longer-a-
startup/ [https://perma.cc/6RP2-VU5Y]. 
308 See e.g., Sarath C P, The Benefits of Cap Table Management 
Software for Startups, HACKERNOON (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://hackernoon.com/benefits-of-using-cap-table-management-software-
in-startups-7365ddd442d [https://perma.cc/3FE3-3LHD] (“[Without cap 
table management software] you might not be able to raise money easily or 
wouldn’t be able to raise money at all.”). 
309 See Nathan Reiff, Series A, B, C Funding: How It Works, 
INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/102015/series-b-c-
funding-what-it-all-means-and-how-it-works.asp [https://perma.cc/8A3T-
PM3W]; see also Brittany Laughlin, Maturity Map—Scale Stage: 75–150 
employees, MEDIUM (Nov. 20, 2014), https://medium.com/startup-
maturity/maturity-map-scale-stage-75-150-employees-98532a1e44cf 
[https://perma.cc/E3B7-WWHK]. 
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corresponding aggregate liquidation preferences amount. 
Therefore, the need for enhanced disclosure will dramatically 
intensify.  
By limiting the enhanced disclosure requirement to 
companies that rely on Rule 701 to issue equity incentives to 
100 employees or more, the proposed amendment is reflecting 
a practical approach. As discussed in Section VI.A.2, 409A 
valuations of early-stage start-ups tend to be unreliable.310 
These appraisals, however, become more reliable as the 
company matures.311  
Moreover, by requiring the disclosure of the 409A 
valuation and exit waterfall to employees and prospective 
employees, the new Rule 701 is likely to encourage these 
mature companies to move from relying on stock options to 
using RSUs as their main equity incentive. That is because 
using stock options as a recruitment device is effective 
predominantly when the 409A valuation is low,312 whereas for 
retention purposes, companies typically wish to signal that 
their valuation is rising.313 The shift from stock options to 
RSUs would be an indirect benefit in and of itself because 
these securities are less risky and do not have the same 
propensity to limit employee mobility as stock options.314  
 
310 See supra notes 277, 280–1 and accompanying text. 
311 See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
312 See supra note 278 and accompanying text.  
313 See supra Section III.C.3. 
314 Alon-Beck offers a more detailed description of the benefits of  RSUs, 
noting that:  
There are several advantages to using RSUs. First, RSUs 
are not as risky for employees; unlike options, RSUs have 
downside protection, because they do not have a strike price. 
Second, unlike options, RSUs will not be worthless as they 
are not subject to the unicorn stock price fluctuations. RSUs 
will always have value equal to the price of the stock 
regardless of when they were granted to employees. Third, 
granting RSUs helps the company mitigate the risk of 
employees trading on secondary markets, as RSUs cannot be 
sold prior to an IPO. 
Alon-Beck, supra note 145, at 169. 
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The 10% aggregate ownership threshold is in line with the 
securities laws’ notion that 10% ownership is a significant 
stake that conveys “insider” status and privileged access to 
company information. For example, Section 16(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires any beneficial 
owners of more than 10% of a class of a company’s equity 
securities to file certain reports regarding their transactions 
and changes to their ownership stake.315 Moreover, the typical 
size of the employee stock option pool in venture capital-
backed companies is roughly ten to fifteen percent.316 The 
proposed threshold is therefore designed to capture companies 
that are structured after the typical model of a start-up 
company, which includes a significant ownership stake by 
rank-and-file employees.317 The threshold  is not intended to 
capture other corporations in which equity ownership is 
limited to executives and the aggregate ownership stake of 
other employees is negligible. 
To recap, the proposed amendments to Rule 701 reflect an 
intermediate approach that balances employees’ need for 
reliable and up-to-date information with issuers’ legitimate 
concerns regarding the confidentiality of their financial 
information and their compliance costs. Specifically, rolling 
back the requirement to disclose financial statements and 
replacing it with the disclosure of 409A valuation information 
and an exit waterfall analysis would improve the 
informational and regulatory environment for employees and 
issuers alike. Moreover, by unifying rules concerning the 
timing of appraisals and disclosures across tax regulation 
(Section 409A) and securities regulation (Rule 701), it is 
possible to lower the regulatory burden on issuers while still 
delivering up-to-date information to employees. Given the 
moderate burden that this regulation would impose on 
issuers, and due to the practical changes that start-ups 
 
315 Section 16 insiders include the company’s directors, officers, and 
shareholders who beneficially own more than ten percent of a class of the 
issuer’s equity securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)–(b) (2012). 
316 See Ward, supra note 99; see also Bowden, supra note 99.   
317 See Blasi, supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
4_2019.3_ARAN (DO NOT DELTE) 1/8/2020  4:44 PM 
962 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
undergo as they grow, imposing the enhanced disclosure 
requirements on companies that rely on Rule 701 to issue 
equity compensation to 100 employees or more is both sensible 
and appropriate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Start-ups rely heavily on equity compensation to compete 
for talent with more established public firms. Even though 
start-ups’ reliance on broad-based equity compensation is not 
a new phenomenon, the legal literature on this subject is just 
starting to emerge.318 The scarcity of academic legal discussion 
regarding employee equity compensation is especially 
puzzling given corporate law’s obsession with executive equity 
compensation.319 This Article lays the foundations for a 
securities regulation approach to human capital investments 
by start-up employees. It establishes that, as opposed to the 
notion promoted by deregulation advocates, pre-negotiated 
equity compensation is a form of investment, not merely a 
bonus or incentive. As such, this sort of compensation 
demands the protection of the securities laws.  
 
318 See Cable, supra note 5, at 619 note 14 (citing relevant literature 
and noting that only “[a] small number of law review articles analyze 
private company equity compensation”); see also Aran, supra note 4; Alon-
Beck, supra note 145; Booth, supra note 63; Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga 
Clawback: Shoring Up the Central Pillar of Innovation, 53  SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 577, 580 (2013); Pollman, supra note 158, at 195–202 (describing the 
evolution of online marketplaces for private companies’ stock). 
319 Executive equity compensation has been one of the most well-
studied and well-debated issues in corporate law for more than 80 years, 
starting with Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. See generally ADOLF A. 
BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). On the debate regarding executive equity incentives, see 
generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 7 (2004); see also 
MICHAEL C. DORF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY 
EXPERIMENT FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT 5–6 (2014) (doubting the theoretical 
justifications for executive equity compensation pay and calling instead for 
salary-based pay); cf. e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO 
Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, but How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138, 
145 (1990) (advocating for equity executive compensation).   
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Thus far, the securities regulation regime has focused 
almost exclusively on cash investments. However, following 
the information technology revolution and the rise of the 
venture capital-backed firms, human capital investment by 
employees became an integral part of the business model of 
high-growth entrepreneurial companies. It is therefore time 
for the securities regulation regime to catch up with market 
dynamics and address the challenges of human capital 
investments by employees.  
As this Article establishes, both on theoretical and 
pragmatic grounds, employees’ investments are susceptible to 
expropriation, agency problems, and information 
asymmetry—just as other forms of capital investments are. 
The current regulatory framework under Rule 701 fails to 
address these concerns, and at the same time it places an 
undue burden on some issuers by requiring the disclosure of 
market-sensitive data.  
This Article offers an outline for a better regulatory scheme 
covering the relationship between private issuers and their 
equity-compensated employees. It calls to revisit Rule 701 
disclosure requirements and to tailor the disclosure to the 
distinct attributes of the venture capital-backed firm—
namely, the existence of multiple classes of stock with 
different voting and cash-flow rights tied to each class. The 
proposed disclosure of valuation information along with an 
exit waterfall analysis is not only materially relevant to the 
investment and employment decisions of employees, but is 
also easier to comply with and cost-effective.   
Better disclosure to employees is needed not only to 
promote fairness and transparency, but also to prevent the 
market for equity-based compensation from becoming a 
market for lemons. If no alterations to Rule 701 are adopted, 
employees might lose trust in this compensation device. Such 
market failure might in turn stifle the competition for talent 
and increase the costs of creating new entrepreneurial firms.  
 
